Project: [Project Name] Location: [Site Location], Activity: Tower Crane Installation, NCR Reference: NCR-HSE-CIV-TC-.... Date Issued: [Date] Issued By: [Consultant / Engineer / HSE Team] Issued To: [Main Contractor / Tower Crane Specialist Contractor]
Note : This report covers the JKKP 6 (NADOPOD) reporting and responses, along with a review of Anti-Corruption Practices. It also includes supporting attachments (not included in this article but all reworded, permitted and declassified) such as the Method Statement (including the Lift Procedure), Detailed Lift Plan outlining crane positioning, lifting routes, and stacking locations, Pre-Lift Checklist to verify all inspections and safety measures are completed, Drawing References, Manufacturer Specifications for equipment and machinery, Job Safety and Environmental Analysis (JSEA), and Risk Assessments.
1. DESCRIPTION OF NON-CONFORMANCE
During the installation of a tower crane on [date], the crane lost stability and collapsed, impacting the adjacent building structure and causing physical damage to reinforced concrete elements at [level / location].
The incident occurred during lifting and positioning works and constitutes a serious non-conformance to project safety, construction, and quality requirements.
2. SAFETY STATUS
No fatality or injury was recorded. At the time of the incident, no personnel, including the tower crane installer, were present within the affected area.
3. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TAKEN
All related works were stopped immediately and the affected area was secured and cordoned off. The Site Safety and Health Officer (SHO) issued a formal Stop Work Order, which was agreed and endorsed by both the Client and the Consultant. Site emergency response procedures were activated. Structural Engineer conducted an initial damage assessment. Relevant stakeholders were formally notified (Client, Consultant, Safety Officer). Temporary stabilization and safety measures were implemented where necessary
4. EXTENT OF DAMAGE
Damage observed to reinforced concrete members (columns / slabs / beams), Localized cracking and spalling noted at impact points, Detailed structural integrity assessment required to determine repair scope
5. NON COMPLIANCE REFERENCE
The incident represents non-compliance with:
Approved Method Statement for Tower Crane Installation, Project Safety Management Plan, Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations, Good engineering and construction practice. It was also noted that although a Method Statement was available, no approved Lifting Plan was attached or referenced, constituting a critical procedural deficiency.
5.1 Standard, Codes of Practice, Guidelines and Legislations
BS 7121 – Code of Practice for Safe Use of Cranes, AISC 360 – Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, US OSHA 1926.753 – Safety Standards for Steel Erection, FMA 1967 - (Factories and Machinery Act): (cranes, hoists). OSHA 2022 - HIRARC for all lifting operations, Factories and Machinery Regulations: "Certificate of Fitness" (CF/PMA) required for cranes, DOSH Guidelines: Registration of Tower Crane/Passenger Hoist/Material Hoist/Gondola, ISO 9927 – Cranes Inspections, BS EN 1090-2 – Execution of Steel Structures.
6. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS AND ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
The investigation identified the following contributing factors:
6.1 Technical Causes
Inadequate baseplate support for the tower crane,
Soft and insufficiently compacted ground conditions beneath the crane base,
Ground bearing capacity not verified against crane load requirements
6.2 Procedural and Documentation Causes
Method Statement did not include a detailed Lifting Plan, including:
Load calculations, ground bearing pressure checks, Lifting sequence and crane radius, Exclusion zones and contingency measures, Absence of formal pre-lift approval and verification
6.3 Supervision and Management Causes
Insufficient engineering supervision during installation, Inadequate coordination between crane supplier, installer, and main contractor
Root Cause Summary:
The incident resulted from combined technical inadequacies, procedural gaps, and management control failures, particularly in ground support verification and lifting planning.
6.4 Engineering Verification : Crane Baseplate & Ground Bearing (Post-Incident Review (Additional Clause Inserted by RE)
As part of the investigation, a review of the engineering requirements for the tower crane base support was conducted. It was established that engineering calculations and verifications were either incomplete or not formally submitted and approved prior to installation.
a) Baseplate Support Calculation
It was found that
The tower crane baseplate bearing pressure was not adequately calculated against the allowable ground bearing capacity,
Load distribution from the crane mast, counterweights, and imposed loads during installation was not clearly demonstrated,
No documented verification was available to confirm that the baseplate size and thickness were sufficient to safely distribute loads to the supporting ground
b) Ground Bearing Capacity Verification
The investigation confirmed that:
Ground bearing capacity was not verified through geotechnical data or site-specific assessment prior to crane installation,
Soil conditions at the crane location were later identified as soft and insufficiently compacted, resulting in uneven settlement,
No formal comparison was made between: Calculated crane loads (kN), Resulting bearing pressures (kN/m²),
Allowable soil bearing capacity
c) Crane Load and Radius Consideration
It was further noted that:
Crane loading conditions during installation were not adequately assessed for maximum crane radius,
Load cases considering: Eccentric loading, Installation sequence, Dynamic effects during lifting were not clearly defined or documented
Absence of a detailed Lifting Plan meant that critical parameters such as crane radius, lifting weight, and load combinations were not formally reviewed or approved
Engineering Conclusion:
The collapse was partially attributed to the absence of verified engineering calculations demonstrating that the baseplate support and ground conditions were capable of safely resisting the crane loads and moments at the required operating radius.
7. ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS - ENGINEERING CONTROLS
The following engineering measures are required prior to any reinstallation:
Submission of engineer-certified calculations covering:
Crane self-weight, counterweight, and imposed loads
Maximum operational and installation crane radius,
Resulting bearing pressures at baseplate level
Verification of ground bearing capacity based on:
Geotechnical report or site-specific soil testing,
Redesign of baseplate / foundation (if required) to achieve acceptable safety factors,
Inclusion of all calculations and verifications within the approved Lifting Plan and Method Statement
8. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED
Immediate suspension of tower crane installation works, Detailed structural assessment and repair design for damaged elements, Rectification works carried out under Engineer’s approval,
Crane reinstallation permitted only after:
Ground improvement works completed, Baseplate redesigned and verified, Ground bearing capacity certified, Submission and approval of a comprehensive Lifting Plan prior to any lifting activity
9. PREVENTIVE ACTIONS
Engineering Controls - Mandatory geotechnical verification for crane foundations, Engineer-certified baseplate and crane foundation design,
Process and Documentation Controls : Method Statements for lifting works to include approved Lifting Plans, Introduction of inspection "hold points" before crane installation,
Supervision and Competency - Appointment of competent lifting supervisors, clear definition of responsibilities among all parties,
Risk Management - Risk Assessment updated to include crane installation and collapse scenarios, Site-wide briefing and lessons learned sharing
10. RISK ASSESSMENT REVIEW
The project Risk Register has been reviewed and updated to reassess the likelihood and severity of crane-related risks and to strengthen mitigation measures.
11. CONCLUSION
Although no fatality or injury occurred, the tower crane collapse represents a serious non-conformance with potential high-risk consequences. Corrective and preventive actions have been implemented to enhance safety, engineering control, and governance.
Subject to verification and acceptance of corrective measures, this NCR may be considered for closure.
NCR Status: Open/Closed (delete as applicable) Prepared By: [Name / Designation] Reviewed By: [Name / Designation] Date: [Date]
.........................................................................[End of Report]........................................................................
Additional Comments : Reporting to JKKP - As per Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) regulations (JKKP 6, (NADOPOD) the incident was reported to the Jabatan Keselamatan dan Kesihatan Pekerjaan (JKKP) by the Client's rep and the SHO immediately following the tower crane collapse. The reporting procedure included:
Notification of the incident to JKKP within the stipulated timeframe for serious workplace accidents, even though no personnel were injured. Submission of an initial incident report, including: Location and description of the incident, Details of affected equipment and structure, Immediate actions taken to secure the site, Coordination with JKKP for any further investigation or inspection required on-site.
This ensures compliance with Section 24 OSHA, demonstrating that the incident was formally reported and managed according to statutory requirements.
JKKP Response : The officers visit will be prioritized based on the severity and risk of the incident as the incident did not cause fatality of serious injury which requires immediate site visits. JKKP requested photos, incident reports and engineering documents. They will decide the date of site visit and reviewal of documentation.
Note to Client, Consultant and Contractor : Once JKKP Legal Investigation arrived, we shall not be interfering in their work. We are allowed to escort them and will answer any question that they asked. Evidence should be preserved intact (e.g. damaged baseplate, crane parts, marks on the ground)
Governance Review : Following the JKKP visit, Following the JKKP visit, the Client requested The Consultant together with the Client's Anti-Corruption Internal Committee to conduct ABMS Assessment on both the Contractor and the Tower Crane (TC) Supplier. This review was performed in accordance with the Client’s Anti-Corruption Policy, focusing on:
Criteria for the selection of subcontractors and suppliers, Last performance evaluations, Conflict of interest and partiality considerations
The final review confirmed that both the Contractor and the TC Supplier possessed the necessary procedures, qualifications, competency certifications, and valid licenses. It was established that the Contractor appointed the TC Supplier based on the Client’s recommendations due to limited selection requirements at the time. No conflicts of interest or indications of partiality or elements of corruption were identified. All staff and personnel of the Contractor and the TC Supplier were found to have signed the No Corruption Oath as part of the Client's ABMS contractual terms and conditions.
However, the incident occurred due to lack of adequate supervision. The collapse happened during the rainy season, and a superficial assessment was conducted, with both parties taking for granted that their previous installations had proceeded without issues.
No comments:
Post a Comment