A DECADE OF JOURNEY WITH GERSON LEHRMAN GROUP

After 10 years with GLG, including my memorable visit to GLG Malaysia and meeting Ms. Karen Soh, the journey has truly been meaningful. I’ve gained invaluable insights, especially in compliance and governance, which have strengthened my work across various engagements.

Here where I am now, certain institutions (not all) still face limitations in formally certifying or validating my diverse experience and competencies due to regulatory frameworks (possibly bureaucracy). That’s why I value platforms like GLG, (even UKAS, C & G, BCA Sing, ABAC CB UK etc) other international professional institutions that recognize expertise based on merit. Their trust has placed me in a comfortable and confident position, and it’s a testament to how Malaysian professionals can be acknowledged globally.

Thank you to the entire GLG team, for the continued trust, opportunities, and commitment to building a strong community of expertise. I look forward to contributing more in 2026 and growing together with the network.

Wishing everyone at GLG a meaningful year-end and an inspiring year ahead.

HIGHLAND TOWERS TRAGEDY REVISITED

Credit : Astro Awani

Disclaimer

This article is a technical synthesis prepared for informational and educational purposes only. All explanations, timelines, interpretations, and engineering assessments in this document are derived from open and publicly accessible sources, including news reports, academic papers, task‑force summaries, legal documents, and published case studies.

This article does not represent, quote, or replace any official government report, forensic investigation report, or authoritative findings issued by relevant Malaysian agencies, professional bodies, or courts.

The analysis is prepared from a civil, structural, and geotechnical engineering perspective, with supplementary notes on regulatory and administrative processes, strictly for general understanding. It may simplify or generalize certain technical aspects and should not be used as a substitute for professional engineering judgement, legal advice, or regulatory compliance.

While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, errors or omissions may exist, and interpretations may differ from official positions. Any use of any contents derived from this article is at the reader’s own discretion and responsibility.

Block 1 of the Highland Towers condominium (Ulu Klang, near Bukit Antarabangsa) collapsed on 11 December 1993 after a large, retrogressive landslide behind the building pushed the foundations and destroyed a retaining structure, the slide was the product of hillside clearance/over-development, failed drainage/diversion works and inadequate slope design/maintenance. 48 people died

1) Short timeline/Project Background

Highland Towers was built in phases in the 1970s–early 1980s at the foot of a steep, terraced hill in Taman Hillview / Ulu Klang. Block 1 (the southern block) is the one that collapsed.

In the early 1990s the Bukit Antarabangsa hilltop behind Highland Towers was developed (new roads, houses and earthworks). That development involved extensive cutting, vegetation removal and installation of diversion/drainage works (the “East Stream” diversion pipe is repeatedly mentioned in accounts). Heavy/repeated rain in December 1993 then triggered progressive slope failure. 

On 11 Dec 1993 the down-slope movement and failure of retaining works/earth mass undermined the piled foundations/rail-pile system behind Block 1; the block moved, fractured and collapsed. Rescue recovered 2 survivors and 48 fatalities.

2) Possible Engineering and Technical Root Causes

Several post-incident theories (later refuted) theorized that:

wastewater and greywater did not discharge properly into designated drains, leading to seepage and percolation into the subsurface soils behind Block 1. Over time, this may have softened the foundation soils, increased moisture content, reduced effective stress, and compromised pile stability. While not the primary confirmed trigger, personally I feel that this factor despite a good theory should be taken into account as a plausible contributing mechanism that exacerbated overall ground saturation and instability.

The following causes; however; are the commonly agreed, evidence-based causes cited by geotechnical studies and task-force reviews:

• Slope destabilisation from hilltop development and vegetation removal - Clearing and terracing reduced root strength, changed surface runoff and exposed slopes to erosion during heavy rain,

• Inadequate drainage and failed diversion pipe(s) - Diversion/pipe systems carrying the east creek and surface runoff either were under-designed, poorly installed or ruptured; water ingress and seepage into the slope greatly reduced soil shear strength and caused progressive erosion. Accounts point to burst diversion pipes and uncontrolled flow of silt, debris and water down the slope,

• Failure of retaining works / shallow support systems - Retaining walls and “raker/rail” piles used behind the car-park/retaining zones were unable to resist the lateral mass of saturated soil. Some authors point to inadequate design for lateral soil loads and progressive undermining of foundations,

• Inadequate site investigation and design assumptions - Subsequent case studies say geotechnical investigations, soil testing and slope stability analysis were insufficient or not conservative enough for the hillside conditions, thus, designs did not properly account for heavy rain pore pressure buildup and retrogressive failure mechanisms,

• Progressive (retrogressive) landslide mechanism - Once a lower portion failed (retaining wall/toe), the failure propagated upslope, moving very large volumes of saturated soil/mud that pushed on foundations (estimates in popular accounts describe huge volumes) and caused structural collapse. 

Put simply: water + unstable cut slope + insufficient drainage + inadequate retaining/foundation design = a retrogressive landslide that overloaded and undermined building foundations.

AI Generated Image - Simple Schematic - Not to Scale

3) Possible Institutional, Procedural failures 

During that time, the technical failures occurred in an environment of regulatory weakness, poor coordination and weak enforcement :

• Approvals without adequate hillside safeguards - Reviews after the event emphasised that state and local approvals allowed hillside development without consistent application of proper safeguards, guidelines or independent verification. The Malaysian Bar Task Force and subsequent studies list lack of compliance checks, inadequate planning procedures and approvals granted without sufficient technical oversight,

• Poor monitoring and maintenance - Drains, diversion pipes and retaining facilities require ongoing inspection and maintenance; the task force cites poor maintenance of drains/retaining walls and failure to act on residents’ complaints or visible signs,

• Fragmented responsibilities and weak verification of competence - The Task Force highlighted poor communication among developers, consultants, local authorities and state agencies and lack of independent verification of safety aspects for hillside works,

• Enforcement limits and legal immunity issues - In subsequent litigation the Ampang Jaya Municipal Council (MPAJ) was at first held to have some pre-collapse liability in lower courts, but the Federal Court later ruled (2006) that the local council was immune under provisions of the Street, Drainage and Building Act (SDBA) for “approval and inspection” functions, a significant legal outcome that limited civil claims against the local authority. That judgment shaped the legal aftermath and discussion about local authority duties. 

4) Authorities and Parties Involved

• Local authority (MPAJ at the time) : issues site approvals, inspects stormwater/drainage and enforces building codes. Investigations and the Task Force later criticised approval practice and monitoring but in litigation MPAJ successfully invoked limited immunity for its regulatory functions,

• Jabatan Kerja Raya (PWD) : involved in slope/road infrastructure and (later) commissioned government inquiries into Bukit Antarabangsa landslides. The Task Force referenced a federal JKR investigation whose full public release was an issue at the time,

• Landowners, developers, consulting engineers : the main parties responsible for safe design, correct earthworks, proper drainage and supervision. Civil suits were pursued against developers, engineers and other private parties. The technical reviews criticise competence and execution at the development level,

• Department of Environment (DOE) and Department of Occupational Safety & Health (DOSH)? : At the time, DOE is normally concerned with environmental impact, erosion control and consent conditions while DOSH at the time focuses on workplace safety (less central to a post-occupancy landslide, but relevant for construction phase safety). Public records and the Task Force emphasis focus mainly on planning, JKR and local council responsibilities (rather than DOSH actions in the disaster’s immediate technical causes, most published technical reviews do not place DOSH at the centre of the collapse causes as the original OSHA 93 was still at its' infancy stage (where the author was involved in the (unofficial) translation of the Parliament handsard in the consultancy capacity serving an Australia-Malaysia JV Safety Consultant)

5) Aftermath

Lawsuits followed - banks and some defendants settled with homeowners. The Federal Court ruling on MPAJ’s immunity (2006) was a landmark - it limited claims against local authorities for pre-collapse regulatory actions, which in turn shaped how liability is apportionable in Malaysia. 

The tragedy triggered repeated public and professional calls for better hillside development guidelines, stricter geotechnical standards, improved drainage and monitoring and clearer institutional responsibilities, many of which were reflected in later regulations, guidelines and the Task Force recommendations. 

6) Lessons Learned 

Practical recommendations that come from the literature and task-force reviews:

• Require competent, independent geotechnical investigation and slope stability analysis for all hillside works; design conservatively for worst-case rainfall/pore pressure,

• Do not allow unchecked top-cutting/overdevelopment without robust retaining systems, positive drainage and a mandatory maintenance plan,

• Insist on durable, inspected drainage/diversion works (pipes, gutters, culverts), surface runoff must not be allowed to concentrate onto or into slopes,

• Improve inter-agency coordination (local councils, JKR/DID, DOE - now known as OSC) and make roles/responsibilities and enforcement clear. 

• Implement slope monitoring, early-warning (movement, pore pressure) and community reporting channels so warning signs trigger action,

7) Short caveats about sources and remaining uncertainties

Multiple technical reviews and academic case studies (UM/UMP theses, research papers) analyze the geotechnical mechanisms; the Malaysian Bar Task Force collated legal and regulatory problems. Some government inquiry reports were not widely released at the time, and some fine technical details (exact pipe locations, as-built details of the retaining pile system) are reconstructed from expert testimony and post-event studies rather than a single public forensic report. 

8)  Other Tragedies

It's important to mention that there have been other incidents at the surroundings after the Highland Towers tragedy :

a) Taman Hillview landslide (20 Nov 2002) : A slope failure in Taman Hillview destroyed a bungalow and killed 8 people. Investigations indicated re-activation of an old landslide/filled zone.

Engineering summary: deep-seated re-activation of an earlier slide mass and unstable fills; local drains and slope materials were friable and became saturated after heavy rainfall/runoff concentration. The incident occurred only a few hundred metres from the Highland Towers site, showing persistent area vulnerability. 

b) Bukit Antarabangsa/Taman Bukit Mewah landslide (6 Dec 2008) : A large landslide destroyed multiple houses and killed several people (reports vary: 4–5 fatalities reported in multiple sources). The failure affected a wide swathe of slope (tens to a hundred metres scale).

Engineering summary: classified by investigators as a deep-seated landslide with a large crown width and significant depth; mechanisms included prolonged/intense rainfall, slope cutting/filling and poor retaining/foundation for slope toes. The failure measurements recorded (crest width, length, depth) are consistent with a deep, translational/rotational mass movement rather than a small local slip.

c) Numerous smaller but significant slides and reactivations (1993–2010s) : Multiple smaller incidents, slope reactivations and failures have been recorded across Ulu Klang/Bukit Antarabangsa (research reports and the Malaysian Bar Task Force catalogue dozens of events and many remediation works). Several caused property loss and some caused fatalities over the years. 

Engineering summary: many were rainfall-triggered, involved cut/fill zones or old landslide scars, and were aggravated by obstructed or misdirected drainage, poor retaining-wall construction (rubble or inadequately anchored walls), or the presence of loose fill materials. Research reviews count multiple major incidents in the area across two decades and emphasise recurring weaknesses in hillside approvals and maintenance. 

9) Recurring Technical Themes (why these keep happening)

• Rainfall + infiltration/pore pressure: Many failures were rainfall-triggered; prolonged or intense rain increases pore water pressure, reducing effective stress and shear strength of residual or fill soils. This is the proximate trigger in most cases,

• Human modification of slopes: Hill cutting, terracing, filling of gullies and vegetation removal changed the hills’ natural equilibrium and often created vulnerable geometry (steep free faces, overloaded benches),

• Inadequate or failed drainage/diversion works: Under-designed, clogged, ruptured or poorly maintained surface and subsurface drainage concentrated flow or allowed seepage into slopes, a common aggravating factor,

• Use of weak fills and poor retaining practice: Poorly compacted fill, rubble walls and non-engineered toe supports were repeatedly implicated. Deep seated failures often involve weak layers or interfaces beneath fills,

• Insufficient geotechnical investigation and oversight: Repeated studies call out limited site investigations, complacent assumptions about soil strength and lack of independent peer review for high-risk hillside works. 

9) Institutional/Regulatory Pattern

After each major failure there were reviews, task-forces and recommendations but published audits (and later events) suggest incomplete implementation, fragmented agency responsibilities and enforcement gaps (per Malaysian Bar Task Force and academic reviews).

10) Quick engineering implications/actions takes

• Treat the whole Bukit Antarabangsa/Taman Hillview area as high-risk: require full geotechnical reinvestigations and monitoring for any new works,

• Inspect and rehabilitate all drainage/diversion conduits: ensure positive discharge away from slopes,

• Replace or underpin weak retaining systems and replace loose fill with engineered solutions (anchors, deep piles, drained retaining systems),

• Enforce independent peer review, maintenance bonds and continuous monitoring (piezometers, inclinometers, rainfall thresholds & alarm/evacuation triggers). 

BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE : ESG IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

Photo Credit : QHSEL Website

The construction industry is one of the world’s largest contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, resource consumption, and waste generation. In today’s global business environment, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles are becoming essential for sustainable development, risk mitigation, and long-term value creation in construction projects.

1) Environmental Responsibility

Construction activities can have significant environmental impacts - energy consumption, carbon emissions, water usage, and soil disturbance. By adopting ESG practices, companies can implement measures:

• Using low-carbon/recycled construction materials.
• Implementing energy-efficient machinery/renewable energy sources on-site.
• Applying water management and reduction plans.
• Incorporating green building designs that minimize the carbon footprint.

Simulated Case Study: ABC Construction Sdn. Bhd. undertook a mid-sized residential project in Malaysia. Through ESG-aligned practices, the company opted for precast concrete elements to reduce material waste, used solar-powered lighting on-site, and established a strict water runoff management system. As a result, carbon emissions were reduced by an estimated 20%, and water usage dropped by 15% compared to traditional construction methods.

2) Social Responsibility

The ‘S’ in ESG emphasizes people - workers, communities, and stakeholders. 

Construction companies can: 

• Ensure worker safety and fair labor practices.
• Engage local communities to minimize social disruption.
• Promote diversity and inclusion in hiring practices.

In the ABC project, the company implemented robust occupational health and safety protocols, conducted monthly community engagement sessions, and trained local workers in new construction technologies. This strengthened community relations and improved employee morale.

3) Governance

Strong governance ensures transparency, accountability, and ethical conduct. 

Construction firms should:

• Maintain clear policies on anti-corruption and compliance.
• Implement project monitoring and reporting systems.
• Establish ESG performance KPIs linked to executive compensation.

ABC Construction adopted a digital reporting system to monitor ESG metrics in real-time, allowing the management team to track environmental targets, safety incidents, and supplier compliance. This transparency boosted investor confidence and positioned the company as a responsible market leader.

Conclusion

Integrating ESG principles into the construction industry is no longer optional - it is a strategic imperative. Companies that proactively embed ESG into their projects can reduce environmental impact, foster positive social outcomes, and enhance governance practices. The ABC Construction case demonstrates that ESG-aligned approaches are practical, measurable, and capable of delivering both financial and societal value.

THE COST OF PROGRESS - DEVELOPMENT VS ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY IN MALAYSIA

Every nation dreams of progress. But progress without balance comes at a price and Malaysia is beginning to feel the cost - floods, recurring slope failures, and severe erosion events are not acts of nature alone, they are the echoes of our own choices. As the nation accelerates its infrastructure and urban expansion, environmental sustainability too often becomes a footnote, rather than a foundation.

1) When Development Turns Disruptive

Hill-cutting for highways, clearing forests for housing, and altering natural waterways for new industrial zones do have consequences even how good the risk assessment is. The soil no longer holds, the rivers overflow, and the cost of repairing damage exceeds what was saved in the first place.

Each disaster is a reminder - we are building faster than we are thinking.

2) ESG: Beyond a Corporate Buzzword

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles are not just for listed companies, they are the new language of accountability for every contractor, developer, and policymaker.

Projects that ignore ESG risk may potentially becoming liabilities - financially, socially, and politically. Responsible contracting must now mean assessing environmental impact, enforcing erosion control, and ensuring compliance is not just “paperwork,” but practice.

3) Responsible Contracting and Leadership

Governments and developers must demand accountability throughout the project chain. It’s not enough to meet deadlines or reduce costs, sustainability should be treated as a performance metric.

Tender evaluations should include environmental stewardship. Site supervision must prioritize ecological safety alongside technical compliance.

4) We Need Real Sustainable Progress

Malaysia doesn’t need to slow down, it needs to WISE up.

True progress doesn’t destroy what sustains us, it preserves it for the next generation. Every hill, river, and forest has value far beyond its immediate commercial worth.

If we continue to equate “development” with “deforestation,” we are not progressing, we are merely shifting the cost from our balance sheets to our children’s future.

PUBLIC TRUST AND GOVERNANCE - WHY INTEGRITY STILL MATTERS IN 2025

In an era where digital systems, AI decision-making, and instant information dominate every aspect of governance and business, integrity remains the one value that technology cannot automate.

The rise of anti-scam initiatives, ISO 37001 Anti-Bribery Management Systems (ABMS), and financial accountability measures in recent years shows that society is not just demanding efficiency but ethics as well. 

Yet, the real question remains: Have we restored public trust?

1) Integrity Beyond Compliance

Too often, integrity is treated as a checklist item, something to “tick off” in annual audits. But integrity isn’t paperwork, it’s a culture.

A nation’s reputation is built not only on how quickly it grows but on how honestly it does so. When ethical procurement, transparent reporting, and responsible leadership become second nature, public confidence follows naturally.

2) The Cost of Losing Trust

Every corruption scandal, every broken promise, and every manipulated tender erodes public confidence not just in institutions but in the idea of fairness itself.

Once trust is lost, no amount of PR or slogans can rebuild it. The real currency of governance is credibility.

3) Technology Can Detect, but People Must Decide

With AI-driven monitoring, blockchain traceability, and digital reporting, we now have tools that can detect irregularities faster than ever.

But technology is only as ethical as the people who use it. Governance needs leaders with moral clarity those who understand that integrity is not just compliance, it’s conviction.

4) A Call to Leadership

In 2025 and beyond, the leaders who will inspire are not the loudest or richest but the most trustworthy.

Integrity is not old-fashioned, it’s the new competitive edge.

When citizens believe their leaders are honest, they’ll walk further with them even through difficult reforms.

CONSTRUCTION RISK ASSESSMENT

As I reviewed past records of my previous “due diligence” assessments in construction projects, the first thing I always examined was the Risk Assessment, especially those prepared prior to project inception. I still observed numerous recurring errors that often led to excessive client complaints and even stop-work orders, resulting in costly consequences for contractors.

Depending on the project, these errors covered areas such as planning and scope, design and technical, human and management, quantification and evaluation, implementation and monitoring, environmental and social aspects, as well as documentation and compliance.

For example, under Planning and Scope, the most crucial part, among common mistakes included incomplete risk identification (e.g. ground conditions, utility conflicts, adjacent property issues), overreliance on generic templates, and failure to consider early uncertainties such as land acquisition delays or unclear design intent. I also found cases of vague scope definitions and poor coordination between architectural, structural, and M & E trades.

I advised contractors to align closely with client requirements, review contracts thoroughly, and conduct workshops at each phase (design, pre-construction, operation). They should also adopt online tools to maintain a live risk register, integrate risk management with cost control, scheduling, and procurement, and apply quantitative methods like Monte Carlo simulation and sensitivity analysis for key risks.

I’ll be conducting another similar assessment soon and frankly, the recurring nature of these issues remains concerning. Someone asked me just now, “I thought contractors don’t do Risk Assessments only HIRARC. Isn’t that the consultant’s or client’s job?” A good question indeed. I should have clarified that in Design and Build contracts, it’s quite common for the contractor to engage their own consultants to carry out a Risk Assessment, which is then reviewed and validated by the client or their authorized representative. On the other hand, HIRARC (Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment, and Risk Control) is typically conducted by the contractor’s Safety and Health Officer (SHO), together with site supervisors trained in HIRARC procedures. The two often get mixed up - Risk Assessment focuses on overall project and design risks, while HIRARC zeroes in on workplace safety and task-level hazards. It’s a subtle but important distinction. To further clarify on the question being asked : Risk Assessment vs HIRARC - 2 different scopes - Risk Assessment (in the broader project management sense) covers strategic, financial, design, technical, environmental, and contractual risks. It’s often done at project inception, design, or pre-construction stages. Responsibility may rest with the consultant, client’s representative, or in Design & Build (D&B) projects the contractor’s design team. The client or their representative then reviews and validates it. HIRARC on the other hand, is part of occupational safety and health (OSH). In Section 1.5 “General Requirement” of the same document, it states: “HIRARC shall be established by contractor and risk control measures shall be implemented before any new work commencement.” It’s done for site activities, work methods, and tasks, not for project-level risk. Conducted by the contractor’s Safety & Health Officer (SHO) or trained supervisors. (DOSH Malaysia’s Guidelines on HIRARC (2008). In the 2008 DOSH guideline (Guidelines for HIRARC), the purpose section (page 1 etc) states: “The purpose of this guideline is to provide a systematic and objective approach to assessing risks… It is intended for use in the construction sector among others" In CIS 25:2018 (CIDB), under Section 1.2 “Normative reference”, it cites Guidelines for Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Risk Control (HIRARC) (2008) by Department of Occupational Safety and Health Malaysia (DOSH) as foundational. In Design & Build (D & B) contracts, the contractor takes on both design and construction responsibilities. Therefore, they are legally and contractually required to manage design-related risks too. Many contractors have in-house design consultants or appoint external ones for this. Their risk assessments are submitted to the client’s consultant or Engineer’s Representative (ER) for validation. Many people confuse the two: 1) HIRARC = task-level safety assessment (hands-on, site-based). 2) Risk Assessment (Project/Design level) = strategic and technical risk management (design, cost, schedule, procurement, etc.). Contractors generally conduct HIRARC as part of OSH compliance, while Risk Assessment at the project level may be done by consultants except in Design & Build projects, where the contractor (with their design consultants) prepares it, and the client or authorized representative validates it. So, yes both are "risk assessments" in nature, but they serve different purposes and fall under different frameworks.

How to Detect and Report Fake Online Reviews

I’ve started noticing a pattern that many people tend to overlook. Fake reviews - whether generated by bots, low-cost marketers using templates, or paid reviewers - often reuse the same words and phrases because they’re mass-produced using copy-paste scripts or automated “mail-merge” style tools.

So here’s a compact, practical playbook: how to spot fake reviews, what actions to take, and which tools or channels can help.

How to Spot Fake Reviews (Quick Checklist)

• Repeated phrasing or identical sentences across multiple reviews - the classic “mail-merge” vibe,

• Clusters of short 5-star reviews with vague praise and no real details (e.g., “Great app! Works perfectly!” or the typical “This is the best app I’ve ever used!”),

• Reviewer profiles with little or no detail, or posting dozens of reviews within days,

• Timing clusters - many reviews appearing within minutes or hours,

• Unverified purchases or missing order details despite claims of ownership,

• Unnatural rating spikes - sudden floods of 5-stars after bad publicity,

• Off-topic or incentivized comments (“DM me for a discount”) - usually against platform policy.

Why Identical Language Appears

• Paid marketers use pre-written templates for speed and volume,

• Bots or low-tier freelancers copy and paste identical text across accounts,

• Some services use “review scripts” that simply replace product names in standard sentences - a digital form of mail-merge.

What Platforms Officially Say

• Google and other major platforms allow you to report reviews that violate content policies,

• Maps and Business Profiles forbid fake engagement - content not based on real experiences or posted for incentives,

• Regulators are tightening control: The U.S. FTC has finalized a rule banning the buying and selling of fake online reviews, raising enforcement risks for both sellers and marketplaces.

Actions You Can Take (Consumer or Business)

• Collect evidence : screenshots, timestamps, reviewer names, URLs, and repeated phrases,

• Report suspicious reviews,

• For apps: use the flag/report option,

• For businesses (Google Maps/Search): Open the Review : Report / Flag as inappropriate in your Business Profile,

If you’re a business or developer:

• Use your Console or Business Profile appeal workflow and attach evidence,

• Follow up if the reviews aren’t removed,

• Public reply strategy: Respond calmly and factually, Ask for order details or invite the reviewer to discuss privately, never attack or accuse - stay professional and brief.

If no action is taken:

• Escalate to platform support, a consumer protection agency, or legal counsel especially since regulators are now more proactive.

Tools and Services That Can Help

• Automated detectors and browser tools like Fakespot and ReviewMeta can analyze aggregate patterns.

• However, availability changes - some have changed ownership or shut down - so always check current reliability before using them.

Conclusion

Platforms combine AI-based detection with human moderation, but it takes time. If you’re a business owner, always appeal through official channels and document everything. Identical phrasing across multiple reviews is strong evidence for moderators or regulators.

And remember, stay calm, stay factual. A composed, evidence-based approach builds credibility with genuine users while exposing the fakery for what it is..