HIGHLAND TOWERS TRAGEDY REVISITED

Credit : Astro Awani

Disclaimer

This article is a technical synthesis prepared for informational and educational purposes only. All explanations, timelines, interpretations, and engineering assessments in this document are derived from open and publicly accessible sources, including news reports, academic papers, task‑force summaries, legal documents, and published case studies.

This article does not represent, quote, or replace any official government report, forensic investigation report, or authoritative findings issued by relevant Malaysian agencies, professional bodies, or courts.

The analysis is prepared from a civil, structural, and geotechnical engineering perspective, with supplementary notes on regulatory and administrative processes, strictly for general understanding. It may simplify or generalize certain technical aspects and should not be used as a substitute for professional engineering judgement, legal advice, or regulatory compliance.

While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, errors or omissions may exist, and interpretations may differ from official positions. Any use of any contents derived from this article is at the reader’s own discretion and responsibility.

Block 1 of the Highland Towers condominium (Ulu Klang, near Bukit Antarabangsa) collapsed on 11 December 1993 after a large, retrogressive landslide behind the building pushed the foundations and destroyed a retaining structure, the slide was the product of hillside clearance/over-development, failed drainage/diversion works and inadequate slope design/maintenance. 48 people died

1) Short timeline/Project Background

Highland Towers was built in phases in the 1970s–early 1980s at the foot of a steep, terraced hill in Taman Hillview / Ulu Klang. Block 1 (the southern block) is the one that collapsed.

In the early 1990s the Bukit Antarabangsa hilltop behind Highland Towers was developed (new roads, houses and earthworks). That development involved extensive cutting, vegetation removal and installation of diversion/drainage works (the “East Stream” diversion pipe is repeatedly mentioned in accounts). Heavy/repeated rain in December 1993 then triggered progressive slope failure. 

On 11 Dec 1993 the down-slope movement and failure of retaining works/earth mass undermined the piled foundations/rail-pile system behind Block 1; the block moved, fractured and collapsed. Rescue recovered 2 survivors and 48 fatalities.

2) Possible Engineering and Technical Root Causes

Several post-incident theories (later refuted) theorized that:

wastewater and greywater did not discharge properly into designated drains, leading to seepage and percolation into the subsurface soils behind Block 1. Over time, this may have softened the foundation soils, increased moisture content, reduced effective stress, and compromised pile stability. While not the primary confirmed trigger, personally I feel that this factor despite a good theory should be taken into account as a plausible contributing mechanism that exacerbated overall ground saturation and instability.

The following causes; however; are the commonly agreed, evidence-based causes cited by geotechnical studies and task-force reviews:

• Slope destabilisation from hilltop development and vegetation removal - Clearing and terracing reduced root strength, changed surface runoff and exposed slopes to erosion during heavy rain,

• Inadequate drainage and failed diversion pipe(s) - Diversion/pipe systems carrying the east creek and surface runoff either were under-designed, poorly installed or ruptured; water ingress and seepage into the slope greatly reduced soil shear strength and caused progressive erosion. Accounts point to burst diversion pipes and uncontrolled flow of silt, debris and water down the slope,

• Failure of retaining works / shallow support systems - Retaining walls and “raker/rail” piles used behind the car-park/retaining zones were unable to resist the lateral mass of saturated soil. Some authors point to inadequate design for lateral soil loads and progressive undermining of foundations,

• Inadequate site investigation and design assumptions - Subsequent case studies say geotechnical investigations, soil testing and slope stability analysis were insufficient or not conservative enough for the hillside conditions, thus, designs did not properly account for heavy rain pore pressure buildup and retrogressive failure mechanisms,

• Progressive (retrogressive) landslide mechanism - Once a lower portion failed (retaining wall/toe), the failure propagated upslope, moving very large volumes of saturated soil/mud that pushed on foundations (estimates in popular accounts describe huge volumes) and caused structural collapse. 

Put simply: water + unstable cut slope + insufficient drainage + inadequate retaining/foundation design = a retrogressive landslide that overloaded and undermined building foundations.

AI Generated Image - Simple Schematic - Not to Scale

3) Possible Institutional, Procedural failures 

During that time, the technical failures occurred in an environment of regulatory weakness, poor coordination and weak enforcement :

• Approvals without adequate hillside safeguards - Reviews after the event emphasised that state and local approvals allowed hillside development without consistent application of proper safeguards, guidelines or independent verification. The Malaysian Bar Task Force and subsequent studies list lack of compliance checks, inadequate planning procedures and approvals granted without sufficient technical oversight,

• Poor monitoring and maintenance - Drains, diversion pipes and retaining facilities require ongoing inspection and maintenance; the task force cites poor maintenance of drains/retaining walls and failure to act on residents’ complaints or visible signs,

• Fragmented responsibilities and weak verification of competence - The Task Force highlighted poor communication among developers, consultants, local authorities and state agencies and lack of independent verification of safety aspects for hillside works,

• Enforcement limits and legal immunity issues - In subsequent litigation the Ampang Jaya Municipal Council (MPAJ) was at first held to have some pre-collapse liability in lower courts, but the Federal Court later ruled (2006) that the local council was immune under provisions of the Street, Drainage and Building Act (SDBA) for “approval and inspection” functions, a significant legal outcome that limited civil claims against the local authority. That judgment shaped the legal aftermath and discussion about local authority duties. 

4) Authorities and Parties Involved

• Local authority (MPAJ at the time) : issues site approvals, inspects stormwater/drainage and enforces building codes. Investigations and the Task Force later criticised approval practice and monitoring but in litigation MPAJ successfully invoked limited immunity for its regulatory functions,

• Jabatan Kerja Raya (PWD) : involved in slope/road infrastructure and (later) commissioned government inquiries into Bukit Antarabangsa landslides. The Task Force referenced a federal JKR investigation whose full public release was an issue at the time,

• Landowners, developers, consulting engineers : the main parties responsible for safe design, correct earthworks, proper drainage and supervision. Civil suits were pursued against developers, engineers and other private parties. The technical reviews criticise competence and execution at the development level,

• Department of Environment (DOE) and Department of Occupational Safety & Health (DOSH)? : At the time, DOE is normally concerned with environmental impact, erosion control and consent conditions while DOSH at the time focuses on workplace safety (less central to a post-occupancy landslide, but relevant for construction phase safety). Public records and the Task Force emphasis focus mainly on planning, JKR and local council responsibilities (rather than DOSH actions in the disaster’s immediate technical causes, most published technical reviews do not place DOSH at the centre of the collapse causes as the original OSHA 93 was still at its' infancy stage (where the author was involved in the (unofficial) translation of the Parliament handsard in the consultancy capacity serving an Australia-Malaysia JV Safety Consultant)

5) Aftermath

Lawsuits followed - banks and some defendants settled with homeowners. The Federal Court ruling on MPAJ’s immunity (2006) was a landmark - it limited claims against local authorities for pre-collapse regulatory actions, which in turn shaped how liability is apportionable in Malaysia. 

The tragedy triggered repeated public and professional calls for better hillside development guidelines, stricter geotechnical standards, improved drainage and monitoring and clearer institutional responsibilities, many of which were reflected in later regulations, guidelines and the Task Force recommendations. 

6) Lessons Learned 

Practical recommendations that come from the literature and task-force reviews:

• Require competent, independent geotechnical investigation and slope stability analysis for all hillside works; design conservatively for worst-case rainfall/pore pressure,

• Do not allow unchecked top-cutting/overdevelopment without robust retaining systems, positive drainage and a mandatory maintenance plan,

• Insist on durable, inspected drainage/diversion works (pipes, gutters, culverts), surface runoff must not be allowed to concentrate onto or into slopes,

• Improve inter-agency coordination (local councils, JKR/DID, DOE - now known as OSC) and make roles/responsibilities and enforcement clear. 

• Implement slope monitoring, early-warning (movement, pore pressure) and community reporting channels so warning signs trigger action,

7) Short caveats about sources and remaining uncertainties

Multiple technical reviews and academic case studies (UM/UMP theses, research papers) analyze the geotechnical mechanisms; the Malaysian Bar Task Force collated legal and regulatory problems. Some government inquiry reports were not widely released at the time, and some fine technical details (exact pipe locations, as-built details of the retaining pile system) are reconstructed from expert testimony and post-event studies rather than a single public forensic report. 

8)  Other Tragedies

It's important to mention that there have been other incidents at the surroundings after the Highland Towers tragedy :

a) Taman Hillview landslide (20 Nov 2002) : A slope failure in Taman Hillview destroyed a bungalow and killed 8 people. Investigations indicated re-activation of an old landslide/filled zone.

Engineering summary: deep-seated re-activation of an earlier slide mass and unstable fills; local drains and slope materials were friable and became saturated after heavy rainfall/runoff concentration. The incident occurred only a few hundred metres from the Highland Towers site, showing persistent area vulnerability. 

b) Bukit Antarabangsa/Taman Bukit Mewah landslide (6 Dec 2008) : A large landslide destroyed multiple houses and killed several people (reports vary: 4–5 fatalities reported in multiple sources). The failure affected a wide swathe of slope (tens to a hundred metres scale).

Engineering summary: classified by investigators as a deep-seated landslide with a large crown width and significant depth; mechanisms included prolonged/intense rainfall, slope cutting/filling and poor retaining/foundation for slope toes. The failure measurements recorded (crest width, length, depth) are consistent with a deep, translational/rotational mass movement rather than a small local slip.

c) Numerous smaller but significant slides and reactivations (1993–2010s) : Multiple smaller incidents, slope reactivations and failures have been recorded across Ulu Klang/Bukit Antarabangsa (research reports and the Malaysian Bar Task Force catalogue dozens of events and many remediation works). Several caused property loss and some caused fatalities over the years. 

Engineering summary: many were rainfall-triggered, involved cut/fill zones or old landslide scars, and were aggravated by obstructed or misdirected drainage, poor retaining-wall construction (rubble or inadequately anchored walls), or the presence of loose fill materials. Research reviews count multiple major incidents in the area across two decades and emphasise recurring weaknesses in hillside approvals and maintenance. 

9) Recurring Technical Themes (why these keep happening)

• Rainfall + infiltration/pore pressure: Many failures were rainfall-triggered; prolonged or intense rain increases pore water pressure, reducing effective stress and shear strength of residual or fill soils. This is the proximate trigger in most cases,

• Human modification of slopes: Hill cutting, terracing, filling of gullies and vegetation removal changed the hills’ natural equilibrium and often created vulnerable geometry (steep free faces, overloaded benches),

• Inadequate or failed drainage/diversion works: Under-designed, clogged, ruptured or poorly maintained surface and subsurface drainage concentrated flow or allowed seepage into slopes, a common aggravating factor,

• Use of weak fills and poor retaining practice: Poorly compacted fill, rubble walls and non-engineered toe supports were repeatedly implicated. Deep seated failures often involve weak layers or interfaces beneath fills,

• Insufficient geotechnical investigation and oversight: Repeated studies call out limited site investigations, complacent assumptions about soil strength and lack of independent peer review for high-risk hillside works. 

9) Institutional/Regulatory Pattern

After each major failure there were reviews, task-forces and recommendations but published audits (and later events) suggest incomplete implementation, fragmented agency responsibilities and enforcement gaps (per Malaysian Bar Task Force and academic reviews).

10) Quick engineering implications/actions takes

• Treat the whole Bukit Antarabangsa/Taman Hillview area as high-risk: require full geotechnical reinvestigations and monitoring for any new works,

• Inspect and rehabilitate all drainage/diversion conduits: ensure positive discharge away from slopes,

• Replace or underpin weak retaining systems and replace loose fill with engineered solutions (anchors, deep piles, drained retaining systems),

• Enforce independent peer review, maintenance bonds and continuous monitoring (piezometers, inclinometers, rainfall thresholds & alarm/evacuation triggers). 

SAMPLE SOPs - RARE EARTH - BY NIK ZAFRI (QHSEL)

ALSO READ " RARE EARTH, THE MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE " 

There should be a clear regulations of rare earth. The Mineral Development Act 1994 amendment should be a great start. I am aware that there are SOPs for sustainable mining for rare earth.

There are many types of rare earth and they are important to the development of modern day technology to name a few - aerospace components, metal halide/mercury vapor lamps, YAG laser, YVO, YS Zirconia, coatings of engines/turbines, electroceramic, solid oxile fuel cell, jewelry, Y Iron Garnet, even smart phones and so many more.

The regulations should take into account : 

a) separation and smelting, 

b) reserves should be determined and any unauthorized use should be fall under iilegal gain (to include procurement and export activities as well)

c) setting a quota and the penalty of anything exceeding the target 

d) when the law is in place, it should be unlawful to stop any inspection activities by the relevant authorities. 

Serious attention should also be given to the transparency in the Supply Chain involving rare earth alongside with a study of impact on the global market as well

The provided samples are for reference only and contains redacted information. It is not related to Malaysia's SOP on Rare Earth and requires further customization to ensure relevance and effectiveness.

1. Purpose

To establish standard practices for processing and extracting rare earth elements (REEs) from various ore sources using hydrometallurgical and pyrometallurgical methods, while ensuring safety, environmental compliance, and radiation protection.

2. Scope

Applicable to all personnel involved in beneficiation, leaching, roasting, solvent extraction, precipitation, and waste management at rare earth processing facilities in China.

3. Ore Types Handled

• Monazite (contains thorium, uranium – high radiation risk)
• Bastnäsite (low radioactivity)
• Xenotime (contains uranium, thorium)
• Ion-adsorption clay (common in southern China)
• Lateritic rare earth ore

4. Processing Methods Covered

• Crushing and Grinding
• Physical Beneficiation (magnetic, flotation, gravity)
• Acid/alkaline leaching
• Roasting (calcination, sulfation, chlorination)
• Solvent Extraction (SX), Ion Exchange
• Precipitation (oxalate, carbonate, hydroxide)
• Final product drying and calcining

5. Safety and PPE Requirements

• Full-body chemical protective suit
• Acid/alkali-resistant gloves and boots
• Face shield or goggles
• Respiratory protection (cartridge respirator or SCBA in roasting areas)
• Radiation dosimeter (for monazite, xenotime zones)
• Continuous ambient radiation monitoring system

6. Operational Procedure

6.1 Ore Preparation and Beneficiation

• Crushing and grinding to below 75–100 µm
• Apply physical separation (gravity, magnetic, flotation) based on ore characteristics.
• Collect tailings for NORM evaluation and containment.

 6.2 Hydrometallurgical Leaching

• Monazite/Xenotime: Alkaline (NaOH) or acid (H₂SO₄, HCl) leaching.
• Clay Ores: Leached with NH₄SO₄ or MgSO₄ at pH 4–6.
• Bastnäsite: Pre-roasting followed by acid leaching (HCl or H₂SO₄).

 Maintain:

• pH control (±0.1)
• Temperature: 50–90°C
• Residence time: 2–8 hours depending on ore

6.3 Pyrometallurgical Treatment (if required)

• Roasting with NaOH - Enhances REE liberation in monazite.
• Sulfation roasting - With H₂SO₄ for bastnäsite or mixed ores.
• Chlorination roasting - Optional for selective REE volatilization.
• Conduct in rotary kiln or fluidized bed under strict emission control.

6.4 Solid-Liquid Separation

• Use filter press or thickener to remove gangue solids.
• Test for radionuclide leach-out before tailings disposal.

6.5 Separation and Purification

Use Solvent Extraction (SX) with D2EHPA, PC88A, Cyanex 272, etc.

Multi-stage SX process for group separation:

• Light REEs (La–Nd)
• Middle REEs (Sm–Gd)
• Heavy REEs (Tb–Lu, Y)

Optimize:

• pH gradients (controlled by NH₄OH or NaOH)
• Aqueous-to-organic ratio
• Number of extraction and stripping stages

6.6 Precipitation and Final Product Recovery

• Use oxalic acid, ammonium carbonate, or NaOH.
• Filtration, washing, drying at 100–200°C.
• Calcination at 800–1000°C for oxide production.

7. Radiation Safety (NORM Management)

• Identify radionuclide content via gamma spectroscopy.
• Store radioactive residues in lined, shielded tailings ponds.
• Quarterly radiation survey of plant and personnel.

Follow China’s 《放射性矿产资源开发利用与环境保护规定》 (Regulations on Radioactive Mineral Development & Environmental Protection).

8. Environmental Management

• Acid/alkali neutralization before discharge.
• Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD) where mandated.
• Emission scrubbers for SOx, NOx, HCl, HF.
• Solid waste monitored under GB standards.

9. Documentation & Records

• Batch processing logs
• Radiation exposure records
• Effluent and emissions monitoring logs
• Maintenance and incident reports

 10. References

• 《稀土工业污染物排放标准》(HJ 3075-2020)
• 《稀土工业清洁生产标准》(HJ/T 408-2007)
• IAEA NORM Safety Guide SSG-60
• GB Standards and local EPB (Environmental Protection Bureau) guidelines

1. Purpose

To establish comprehensive procedures for the processing, storage, quality control, delivery, sales, and customer follow-up of rare earth elements (REEs), ensuring product quality, safety, regulatory compliance, and customer satisfaction.

2. Scope

Covers the full value chain of REE operations in China: from ore reception to finished product delivery, including storage, logistics, sales, and post-sale support.

3. Key Sections Overview

• Ore Handling and Processing
• Product Storage and Inventory
• Delivery and Logistics
• Sales and Export Documentation
• Customer Follow-Up and After-Sales Service
• Radiation and Environmental Compliance
• Records and Documentation

4. Ore Handling and Processing

(Refer to previous SOP sections covering Crushing, Leaching, Roasting, SX, and Product Recovery.)

5. Product Storage and Inventory

5.1 Storage of Intermediate and Final Products

Use dedicated silos, bins, or sealed containers for:

• REE hydroxide, oxalate, carbonate, or oxide
• Grouped REEs (e.g., light, heavy REE mix)
• Individual oxides (e.g., Nd₂O₃, Dy₂O₃, La₂O₃)
• Maintain separate radiation-designated areas for monazite-derived products.
• Use humidity control and inert gas purging (N₂) where applicable.

5.2 Labelling and Segregation

 Clear product labels with:

• Batch number
• Product grade
• Radiation status (if applicable)
• Packing date and expiry (for specific applications)

5.3 Inventory Management

• Use ERP or digital inventory system.
• FIFO (First-In-First-Out) principle.
• Real-time stock balance monitoring.
• Daily reconciliation with dispatch records.

6. Delivery and Logistics

6.1 Packaging

• Use sealed, labeled, and moisture-resistant packaging.
• For export-grade REOs: follow customer packaging specifications.
• UN-approved containers for radioactive or hazardous materials.

6.2 Logistics Coordination

• Appoint a logistics coordinator (Screening/Vetting Required)
• Secure trucking with GPS tracking.

Verify documentation before dispatch:

• Bill of Lading
• Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)
• Radiation declaration (for monazite-derived products)
• Customs papers (if applicable)

6.3 Export Compliance

Register with China’s Ministry of Commerce for REE export quotas.

Prepare:

• Export license
• Environmental compliance certificate
• Customer’s End-User Declaration

7. Sales and Customer Follow-Up

7.1 Sales Documentation

• Quotation → Purchase Order → Proforma Invoice → Commercial Invoice
• Maintain customer-specific specs, lead times, and delivery conditions.

7.2 Sales Channels

• Direct to OEMs (e.g., magnets, catalysts, batteries)
• Traders with valid permits
• Export agents for international buyers

7.3 Customer Support and Follow-Up

Assign Key Account Managers (KAMs) for large buyers.

Post-delivery:

• Confirm receipt and satisfaction within 7 days.
• Provide technical documentation and usage guides.
• Collect customer feedback and register in CRM system.
• Offer assistance in application issues (e.g., solubility, particle size)

8. Radiation and Environmental Compliance (NORM)

• Clearly segregate NORM-related products and waste storage.
• Quarterly third-party audit of storage and transport practices.
• Adhere to Chinese and IAEA standards for all radioactive shipments.

9. Records and Documentation

10. Review and Update

This SOP shall be reviewed every 12 months or when:

• There are process changes
• Regulatory updates
• New export controls or NORM classifications

PENCEGAHAN LEBIH BAIK DARI BERUBAT

Tengku Adnan

KUALA LUMPUR: Pusat Tahfiz Darul Quran Ittifaqiyah, Jalan Keramat Hujung, di sini, dilaporkan tidak memenuhi tahap keselamatan ditetapkan.

Menteri Wilayah Persekutuan, Datuk Seri Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor, berkata pusat tahfiz berkenaan hanya mempunyai satu laluan keluar dan masuk menuju ke tingkat atas.

"Kita memuji langkah pengurusan pusat tahfiz yang menawarkan pendidikan percuma kepada pelajar yang terdiri daripada keluarga kurang berkemampuan, namun aspek keselamatan perlu diberi keutamaan.

"Berdasarkan tinjauan bersama Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (DBKL), kita dapati wujud kesalahan kerana premis ini hanya mempunyai satu laluan dan ia berbahaya dari segi keselamatan," katanya selepas meninjau lokasi kejadian, pagi tadi.

Tengku Adnan berkata, pemilik dan pengurusan pusat tahfiz berkenaan juga didapati tidak mempunyai kelulusan Jabatan Bomba dan Penyelamat serta DBKL untuk menjalankan aktiviti pengajian tahfiz di premis berkenaan.

"Kadang-kadang bila kita tegur dan suruh tutup sesebuah premis, saya dan DBKL dimarahi dan dikatakan berlaku tidak adil namun sebenarnya kita tidak mahu perkara seperti ini berlaku," katanya.

Katanya, beliau sudah mengarahkan semua pegawai di Kementerian Wilayah Persekutuan dan DBKL menjalankan pemeriksaan ke atas semua pusat tahfiz di ibu negara dan Putrajaya, hari ini.

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Nota

Saya harap pembaca membaca dulu halatuju komen yang saya tulis ini. Ianya tidak berniat untuk menyalahkan samada pihak tahfiz mahupun pihak berkuasa. Yang sudah berlaku, sudahpun berlaku - yang telah pergi, telah pun pergi dan tidak dapat dikembalikan lagi.

Yang penting, apa langkah kita selanjutnya untuk mengelakkan perkara yang sama berulang - sebagai salah satu dari cabang usaha ikhtiar?

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Innaa lillaahi wa innaa ilaihi roo ji-'uun - Al-Fatihah.

Pertama saya ingin merakamkan ucapan takziah kepada keluarga yang terlibat. Semoga semua anak-anak ini digolongkan Allah SWT di kalangan syuhada. Saya harap dapatlah kaum keluarga redha akan tragedi ini.

Apa yang disebut oleh Datuk Seri Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor memang ada kebenarannya. Namun pada saya, DBKL perlu bertegas demi keselamatan premis terutamanya yang berada di tengah-tengah bandaraya.

Atas dasar kemanusiaan, saya turut bersetuju dengan apa yang disebut oleh YB Menteri Wilayah mengenai perkhidmatan percuma yang diberikan oleh tahfiz berkenaan tetapi aspek keselamatan dan kesihatan pekerjaan perlu bersifat preventif serta bukannya "corrective". Ianya seolah-olah kita menanti bencana akan berlaku. Kita tidak boleh ada sikap "berserah sahaja" dan tiada usaha ikhtiar yang dilakukan untuk mencegah. Dan apabila sesuatu tragedi berlaku, kita ada budaya "menuding jari" (blaming culture)

Sudah tiba masanya, DBKL, JKKP, JAS, BOMBA dll yang berkenaan perlu duduk bersama dan memikirkan cara-cara proaktif seperti mengadakan "fire-drill", pemeriksaan berkala dan penilaian risiko bukan sahaja ke atas premis seperti ini tetapi ke atas semua premis. Ini kerana saya lihat, banyak tangga kecemasan (fire escape) di belakang bangunan telah dirobohkan, "fire door" yang tidak berfungsi, tangga kecemasan dalaman dijadikan stor barangan, penggunaan dapor gas dengan cara yang tidak selamat, tiadanya alat pemadam kebakaran (atau bertarikh luput atau ada tetapi tidak tahu digunakan), kesukaran akses kepada pihak BOMBA untuk memadamkan kebakaran, kesukaran akses untuk mangsa keluar, tiadanya penggera keselamatan, tiadanya pelan lantai, tiadanya "emergency escape route" dll.

Yang paling penting bila bercakap mengenai "preventive action" atau "risk management" ialah LATIHAN, BENGKEL, INDUKSI yang secukupnya perlu diberikan kepada semua pengusaha-pengusaha mengenai pentingnya aspek keselamatan dan kesihatan pekerjaan (dan alam sekitar) (SHE) terjaga.

Aspek SHE bukan sahaja perlu dijaga semasa premis dibina, ianya perlu dirancang semasa fasa rekabentuk, fasa tender, fasa pembinaan, fasa pasca-pembinaan, fasa penyerahan kembali tapak - MALAH perlunya susulan semasa ianya beroperasi.

PIAWAIAN SUMBER TENAGA DAN KAWALAN EMISI KARBON

Oleh Nik Zafri Abdul Majid - Januari, 2010

Seluruh dunia kini sedang memberikan perhatian yang serius kepada isu emisi karbon. Secara rambang hampir seluruh premis di dunia menyumbang kepada 50% penggunaan tenaga - ini termasuklah Malaysia. Isu emisi karbon dijangka akan mencetuskan pula fokus kepada kod dan piawaian tenaga - ini bermakna jika kita tidak mempunyai kod/piawaian atau ada kod piawaian tetapi tidak mencukupi, maka usaha untuk menaikkan taraf kod/piawaian yang sedia ada atau mewujudkan kod/piawaian yang lebih komprehensif perlu diadakan.

Mewujudkan atau menaiktaraf kod/piawaian adalah selaras dengan cadangan YB Dato' Seri Ong Ka Ting, Menteri Sumber Asli dan Alam Sekitar dalam Mesyuarat ke 3, Penggal 2, Parlimen 12 yang meminta satu pelan induk perlu digariskan oleh Kerajaan Malaysia untuk memastikan paras pengeluaran karbon di Malaysia benar-benar tidak menaik dan dapat dikawal sehingga ianya tidak lebih daripada paras tahun 2005 menjelang satu tempoh masa daripada sekarang.

Setakat artikel ini ditulis, saya mendapati satu standard (pada asalnya diterbitkan pada tahun 2004) dikenali sebagai 90.1 iaitu piawaian ASHRAE memberikan satu panduan untuk mencapai 30% penjimatan tenaga (draf standard ini dijangka terbit pada bila-bila masa dalam tahun 2010. Selain itu, standard seperti LEEDS (Green Building) and EMS ISO 14000 juga boleh dijadikan panduan kepada kawalan emisi karbon menerusi penjimatan tenaga.

Standard ini begitu penting pada Malaysia sebagai langkah awal mengawal pembaziran tenaga di samping emisi karbon. Jabatan Alam Sekitar, Jabatan Keselamatan dan Kesihatan Pekerjaan, Suruhanjaya Tenaga dsb. juga boleh bekerjasama dalam mewujudkan standard yang dimaksudkan.

Antara perkara-perkara yang boleh diambilkira ialah :

a) Keperluan penggunaan peralatan penyejuk (cooling/refrigeration) dan pemanas (heater/heating equipments) dalam semua jenis industri termasuk rumah kediaman yang mungkin berbeza mengikut cuaca/iklim negara berkenaan. Justifikasi cadangan saya ini ialah menghala kepada kesan ekonomi penggunaan peralatan berkenaan serta cara-cara penjimatan boleh dilakukan ke atas peralatan contohnya mengadakan alat penjimat tenaga secara 'built-in' kepada peralatan yang dimaksudkan.

b) Perkara-perkara yang kompleks seperti syarat-syarat untuk mendapat Sijil Layak Menduduki sesebuah bangunan juga perlu diambilkira - contohnya memberikan kelulusan kepada mereka yang mengutamakan penjimatan tenaga dan penjagaan alam sekitar atau konsep 'bangunan hijau' mengikut standard yang berkaitan.

c) Latihan, siri-siri ceramah dsb. bagi memastikan kefahaman atau mencetuskan kesedaran masyarakat atau kakitangan betapa pentingnya tahap emisi karbon dan penjimatan tenaga kepada mereka dalam bentuk wang ringgit.

Saya berharap agar standard/piawaian tenaga yang bakal dikeluarkan akan mengketengahkan syarat-syarat yang agak ketat supaya ianya dipatuhi demi trend semasa pasaran global dan suasana ekonomi yang sedang mengalami perubahan dalam konteks pembekalan tenaga.

Carbon Emission/Standards Malaysia need to come out with Master Plan and Codes of Practice on Carbon Emission/Energy Savings Agree but all parties must cooperate with the Government Disagree - our country is not at the critical level yet view results