PENGUBAHAN WANG HARAM/MONEY LAUNDERING

Kajian : Nik Zafri (Januari, 2006)


Artikel berikut adalah kajian bebas pengarang dan bukanlah bertujuan untuk memberikan khidmat nasihat kepada pembaca. Pembaca digalakkan menghubungi pihak yang berwajib seperti institusi perbankan dan kewangan.

Mungkin ramai yang pernah mendengar frasa 'money laundering' atau 'pengubahan wang haram'. Aktiviti money laundering ini telah mengakibatkan kerugian jutaan ringgit kepada sesebuah negara. Setakat ini Malaysia mengamalkan dasar yang agak ketat bagi menangani masalah ini.

Money laundering dikatakan amat popular di peringkat antarabangsa terutamanya golongan pengedar-pengedar dadah, kongsi gelap, bookie, pemain judi dan kumpulan pengganas. Walaupun terdapat pelbagai undang-undang telah digubal di seluruh dunia, namun money laundering, amat sukar di kawal.

Dikatakan money laundering berasal daripada satu kumpulan kongsi gelap/penjenayah antarabangsa yang menggunakan duit hasil kegiatan jenayah untuk 'dilaburkan' atau 'dibersihkan' dengan menggunakan jalan-jalan yang berlandaskan undang-undang seperti menerusi aktiviti pembelian saham, stok, derivatif, futures, FOREX, insurans, pembiayaan industri/projek yang besar, terlibat dalam sektor hartanah dan sebagainya. Malah 'penjenayah' menggunakan wang berkenaan bagi 'membiayai' dan 'membeli' bank-bank tertentu (yang bermasalah) untuk diniagakan menerusi pelbagai skim pinjaman berfaedah termasuk segala potongan cukai bagi 'membersihkan' wang berkenaan dan mengikut 'lunas undang-undang' serta dianggap sebagai 'revenue'/hasil. - ('doing the wrong thing the right way' - pengarang)

Suatu laporan antarabangsa pernah dikeluarkan yang menyatakan bahawa kewujudan Money Laundering juga menandakan wujudnya operasi jenayah terancang (organised crime) dan transnasional. Money Laundering juga amat cepat evolusinya di mana penjenayah amat bijak menyesuaikan teknik 'pelaburan' agar sukar dikesan tambahan pula dengan adanya teknologi ICT yang mempermudah dan mempercepatkan lagi urusan 'perniagaan'. Apabila banyak keuntungan diperolehi dari 'pelaburan' money laundering, maka dengan sendirinya kekemungkinan 'keuntungan' ini digunakan pula untuk membiayai aktiviti jenayah adalah tinggi.

Antara cara-cara money laundering dilakukan ialah :

1) Pelaburan
Memandangkan money laundering melibatkan perniagaan 'tunai' yang besar, wang ini akan dilaburkan menerusi sistem kewangan atau ekonomi retail atau diseludup keluar dari sesebuah negara. Matlamat mereka ialah untuk 'melarikan' wang berkenaan daripada 'sumber asal' bagi mengelakkan dikesan oleh pihak berkuasa. Kemudian ianya akan ditukar dalam bentuk cek kembara atau wang pos dan sebagainya.

2) Pelapisan

'Pelapisan' merupakan konsep menjadikan wang haram menerusi proses pusingan pelbagai tingkat yang kompleks termasuk menyerap ke dalam sistem pengauditan. Tujuan utama 'pelapisan' dilakukan ialah untuk 'menidakkaitkan sejauh mungkin' wang berkenaan daripada 'sumber asalnya'. Pelapisan biasanya dilakukan dengan aktiviti simpanan dan pengeluaran secara berulang kali menerusi akaun di bank-bank offshore di mana akaun-akaun ini melibatkan syarikat-syarikat 'kosong' yang menggunakan kaedah Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT). Aktiviti ini amat sukar dikesan kerana wang berkenaan dibahagi-bahagikan kepada terlalu ramai individu dan 'syarikat-syarikat' dan lebih menyulitkan lagi, 'penjenayah' mengetahui bahawa apabila berlaku terlalu banyak transaksi harian di pihak bank-bank offshore, maka mereka akan mudah 'menyelinap masuk' tanpa dikesan. Selain itu, mereka juga membuat pembelian stok, komoditi, FOREX dan lain-lain yang juga sukar dikesan kerana transaksi harian yang terlalu tinggi.

3) Integrasi dan Penyerapan

Wang haram diintegrasikan atau diserap ke dalam sistem kewangan dan ekonomi yang sah dan menjadikan wang ini akhirnya seolah-olah 'dimiliki secara sah' oleh 'penjenayah'.

Contohnya :

a. Dengan menubuhkan syarikat di negara-negara tertentu di mana 'transaksinya terjamin dirahsiakan'. Kemudian, mereka akan kononnya 'diluluskan' pinjaman yang berasal daripada 'wang haram'. Cara ini juga memberikan ruang untuk mendapatkan 'potongan cukai' dan 'pembayaran kembali' wang berkenaan dengan 'faedah'nya sekali.

b. Cara yang lain ialah menghantar invois yang bersabit dengan perniagaan impot/ekspot yang memudahkan penjenayah ini memindahkan wang berkenaan dari satu syarikat ke satu syarikat yang lain atau dari satu negara ke satu negara yang lain.

c. Menggunakan kaedah EFT menerusi bank-bank yang 'dikuasai' oleh 'penjenayah' ini - (melalui pembelian, pelaburan, pembiayaan wang yang tinggi)

d. Membuka/menjalankan perniagaan menerusi syarikat-syarikat (berlesen) pemberi pinjam wang atau pembiayaan secara geran, pengurusan dana - malah pengurup wang.

Walaupun terdapat banyak undang-undang Anti-Laundering digubal di seluruh dunia seperti peruntukan menghadkan jumlah simpanan pada sesuatu masa, tempoh bertenang untuk pemeriksaan, tetapi penjenayah-penjenayah ini tetap pandai mengaburi mata pihak insitusi perbankan dan kewangan dengan hanya menerusi kaedah-kaedah menggunakan nama ramai individu, syarikat-syarikat yang menjalankan berbagai jenis perniagaan. Kita perlu menentang dengan apa juga cara untuk membasmi kegiatan ini kerana ianya mampu melumpuhkan ekonomi negara dalam masa yang sangat pantas.

DERIVATIVES CLEARINGHOUSES

This note is not representing the official views and regulations set by by the authorities related to the bourse or the like. It serves merely as a personal research and quick guide. The interested parties are advised to contact Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing

May 25, 2011
by : Dr. Ben Steil

Thank you for the opportunity to present to you this morning my views on the important subject of derivatives clearing.

The collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG in September of 2008 highlighted the importance of regulatory reforms that go beyond trying to prevent individual financial institutions from failing. We need reforms that act to make our markets more resilient in the face of such failures – what engineers and risk managers call “safe-fail” approaches to risk management. Well capitalized and regulated central derivatives clearinghouses to track exposures, to net trades and to novate them, to collect proper margin on a timely basis, and to absorb default risk have historically provided the best example of successful “safe-fail” risk management in the derivatives industry.

Compare the collapse of the large hedge fund Amaranth in 2006 with the collapse of AIG in 2008. Both were laid low by derivatives exposures. Yet whereas the failure of Amaranth caused barely a ripple in the markets, owing to its exposures having been in centrally cleared exchange-traded natural gas futures contracts, the failure of AIG precipitated justifiable concerns of widespread market contagion that ultimately required a massive and enormously controversial government intervention and bailout to contain. Had AIG been building derivatives exposures on-exchange rather than in the OTC markets, its reckless speculation would have been brought to a halt much earlier owing to minute-by-minute exposure-tracking in the clearinghouse and unambiguous mark-to-market and margining rules. The long, drawn-out wrangling between AIG and Goldman Sachs over the collateral required to cover AIG’s deteriorating derivatives positions would never have been possible had a clearinghouse stood between the two.

Furthermore, AIG’s net exposures in the marketplace would not have been the subject of rumor or surmise, but a simple matter of record at the clearinghouse.

Encouraging a shift in derivatives trading from OTC markets without central clearing to organized, government-regulated markets with central clearing is challenging, however, for two major reasons.

First, the dealers that dominate the OTC derivatives business have no incentive to accommodate such a shift. Dealers earn approximately $55 billion in annual revenues from OTC derivatives trading. Some of the largest earn up to 16% of their revenues from such trading. The movement of such trading onto exchanges and central clearinghouses has the potential to widen market participation significantly, to increase the transparency of prices, to reduce trading costs through the netting of transactions, and in consequence to reduce the trading profits of the largest dealers materially. It is natural, therefore, that dealers should resist a movement in trading activity onto exchanges and clearinghouses. Where compelled by regulation to accommodate it, dealers can also be expected to take measures to control the structure of, and limit direct access to, the clearing operations. The use of measures such as unnecessarily high capital requirements in order to keep smaller competitors or buy-side institutions from participating directly as clearinghouse members are to be expected.

Indeed, trading infrastructure providers organized as exclusive mutual societies of major banks or dealers have a long history of restricting market access. For example, in the foreign exchange markets, the bank-controlled CLS settlement system has long resisted initiatives by exchanges and other trading service providers to pre-net trades through a third-party clearing system prior to settlement. Such netting would significantly reduce FX trading costs for many market participants, but would also reduce the settlement revenues generated by CLS and reduce the trade intermediation profits of the largest FX dealing banks. Other settlement service providers such as DTCC have no incentive to offer competition to CLS, as they are owned by the very same banks. There are therefore solid grounds for regulators to apply basic antitrust principles to the clearing and settlement businesses in order to ensure that market access is not being unduly restricted by membership or ownership limitations that cannot be justified on safety and soundness grounds.

Second, some types of derivatives contracts do not lend themselves to centralized clearing as well as others. Customized contracts, or contracts which are functionally equivalent to insurance contracts on rare events, are examples. Since it can be difficult for policymakers or regulators to determine definitively whether given contracts - new types of which are being created all the time - are well suited for central clearing, it is appropriate to put in place certain basic trading regulations in the OTC markets that will serve both to make such trading less likely to produce another AIG disaster and to encourage the movement of trading in suitable products onto central clearinghouses. Two such measures would be to apply higher regulatory capital requirements for non-cleared trades, in consequence of the higher counterparty risk implied by such trades, and to mandate trade registration and collateral management by a regulated third party, such as an exchange.

In establishing the regulatory standards for the clearing of derivatives transactions, it is imperative for lawmakers and regulators to be fully conscious of the fact that the derivatives market is effectively international, rather than national, and that it is exceptionally easy for market participants to change the legal domicile of their trading activities with a keystroke or a simple change of trading algorithm. In this regard, I would highlight two important areas of concern.

First, the three major world authorities controlling the structure of the derivatives clearing business – the SEC, the CFTC, and the European Commission – each take a very different view of the matter. Historically, the SEC has applied what I would term the “utility” model to the industry, the CFTC has applied what I would term the “silo” model, and the European Commission has applied what I would term the “spaghetti” model. The broad benefits of each are depicted in the matrix below.



The SEC’s utility model favors institutions operated outside the individual exchanges; in particular the DTCC in the equity markets and the OCC in the options markets. This approach has generally performed well in terms of safety and soundness, and in encouraging competition among exchanges. It performs poorly, however, in terms of encouraging innovation in clearing and settlement services.

The CFTC’s silo model allows the individual exchanges to control their own clearinghouses. This approach has also performed well in terms of safety and soundness. The recent decision of the CME to raise margin requirements on silver trading is evidence of the model working well, in terms of the exchange placing a premium on the integrity and solvency of its clearing operations rather than trying to maximize short-term speculative trading volumes. The CFTC’s model also encourages innovation in product development in a way in which the SEC’s model does not. This is because CFTC-regulated futures exchanges can capture the benefits of product innovation in terms of generating trading volumes, whereas SEC-regulated options exchanges risk seeing trading volumes in new products migrate to other exchanges, all of which use clearing services provided by the OCC. The CFTC model, in consequence, does not promote competition from new trading venues in the same way that the SEC model does. It does, however, promote wider direct market participation in clearing systems, as demutualized exchanges have a commercial interest in expanding such access to buy-side institutions that dealers normally want to exclude. This reduces trading costs and expands market liquidity.

The European Commission’s spaghetti model, enshrined in its so-called “Code of Conduct” for the industry, compels the EU’s clearinghouses to interoperate with each other. It also encourages both exchanges and clearinghouses to compete against each other. Like the SEC’s model, however, it can be expected to dampen incentives for product innovation, as clearing competition makes it more difficult for exchanges that own clearinghouses to maximize their trading and clearing revenue returns on new product development. More importantly, this model, I believe, is not conducive to ensuring safety and soundness, as it encourages clearinghouses to cut margin requirements and other prudential measures as a way to attract business from, or prevent business from moving to, other clearinghouses. It also injects a major element of operational risk into the business, in consequence of each clearinghouse being vulnerable to failures of technology or risk management in others.

On balance, I believe that the CFTC’s model is the most appropriate for the derivatives industry, and I believe that the unworkability of the European Commission’s spaghetti approach will ultimately oblige it to move back in the CFTC’s direction. Although the CFTC’s approach does not promote inter-exchange competition as directly as the SEC’s model, it is important to note that new competitors are, in fact, entering into the futures business. ELX, founded in 2009, and NYPC , a recent joint venture between the NYSE and the DTCC which facilitates cross-margining of multiple products, are now competing with the CME in the financial futures space.

The second point I would like to make regarding the global nature of the derivatives trading industry is that certain measures to curb speculative activity being debated here in Washington are highly likely to push trading activity “off exchange” – precisely the opposite of Congress’s intent. For example, a so-called Tobin Tax on futures transactions at the level being discussed last year, 2 basis points (0.02%), would be equivalent to over 400 times the CME transaction fee on Eurodollar futures. It should go without saying that a tax this large, relative to the current transaction fee on the underlying contract, would push all of this trading off the CME and into alternative jurisdictions.

Likewise, commodity market position limits, if not harmonized with UK and other national authorities, will merely push such trading outside the CFTC’s jurisdiction. There is already an active regulatory arbitrage on oil and natural gas futures between the CME’s Nymex exchange, which trades such contracts under CFTC regulation, and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), which trades such contracts under FSA regulation in London. We have seen indications of movement in trading from Nymex to ICE in line with market perceptions of the likelihood of such limits being imposed in the United States. In short, we must be extraordinarily cautious not to undermine Congress’s worthy goal of bringing more derivatives trading under the purview of US-regulated exchanges and clearinghouses by inadvertently providing major market participants incentives to do precisely the opposite.

Thank you for the opportunity to present my views today on this important issue.

GREEN OCEAN CORPORATION SDN. BHD. (GOCEAN) - GO GREEN, BE GREEN, SELL GREEN - PERSONAL VIEWS BY NIK ZAFRI


(Latest Development! 10.15am - 30/12/2010
STOP PRESS : Plantation related stocks up"

As forecasted - with news that CPO will go up from RM3k-3.5k/metric tonne, today - as I speak - around 9.30am, 30/12/2010 - till now, GOCEAN is experiencing major changes in its price. Congratulations GOCEAN.)



Disclaimer : I do not represent the corporation in this article. Whatever being expressed is solely the author's opinion. Please refer their official website for further information.

I've been looking into some 'sleeping giants' for a long time.



And today I wish to speak on a corporation that attracts my attention for the last 2 weeks of trading. I hope everyone will share my enthusiasm.

(Please don't base your views on their current performance of shares...just read on)

The company was formerly known as Online One Corporation Berhad and changed its name to Green Ocean Corporation Berhad in April 2009. Green Ocean Corporation was incorporated in 2003 and is based in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia.

Green Ocean Corporation Berhad (GOCEAN), an investment holding company, engages in the development of biotechnology products in Malaysia.

As we all know, GREEN is now associated with almost all industries in this world. We have LEEDS Certification (Green Building), EMS ISO 14000, Sustainability, Big Campaigns and various environmental awards for corporations practicing GREEN as part of their corporate responsibility. GOCEAN is definitely one of them - with its strong motto - BUY GREEN, BE GREEN, SELL GREEN.

So to all GREEN lovers out there (yes I'm one of them), here's your chance to save the EARTH!

The company involves in crushing palm kernel, refining palm oil and palm kernel oil, and producing palm kernel expellers and cooking oil.

Despite some quarters felt that maintaining the neutral call on the Malaysian palm oil sector due to current 2 year old palm oil price upcycle, and that Malaysia is continuing with a plan to mandate a 5% palm-oil-based methyl ester blend in conventional diesel by June 2011 (next year), I still somehow notice significant changes in Bursa Malaysia Derivatives’ star product, the Crude Palm Oil Futures contract, or better known by all of us as the FCPO contract which has been cited as the MOST actively traded derivatives contracts and has been the GLOBALLY PREFERRED BENCHMARK FOR THE PRICING OF CPO.

If this is the case, then, GOCEAN and their counterparts will definitely see some significant changes next year. Let's say it's June, 2011, at least they can still prepare themselves for the changes.

GOCEAN also provides information communication technology solutions, including software, and third party hardware and software; implementation and integration services; business continuity outsourcing solutions; and business intelligence solutions.

Being a self-ICT-literate person myself, GOCEAN has definitely invested on the right product. The setback however is unexpected - perhaps GOCEAN is too ahead of time with this plan. Unless the corporation has something to do with government contracts (which I think they will be heading towards that direction) and in the future, taking in many ICT professionals in the field (during expansion), then I know in my heart that ICT is a GOOD Investment. Who knows, GOCEAN might hit the jackpot.

Apart from the abovementioned, GOCEAN offers financial services solutions, infrastructure services, business service management, and information security solutions.

Further, it engages in the research and development of palm oil related industries; and sales, marketing, and distribution of enzyme, conjugated linoleic acid, and direct fed microbials, as well as the marketing and distribution of storage solutions.

Now, can anyone tell me that GOCEAN has no potentials in 2011? I have also noticed some 'reengineering' are being actively done in the company - so someone inside GOCEAN is smart enough to prepare itself for 2011 - for the BEST. We can expect the Q3 2011 results next February. (aah you need tips : Look at the 'expected book value' and 'the future market value' based on my article herein - also look into debt/equity ratio...do some homework 'lah')

Figures might not look so interesting but it's the indicators in the figures that will tell investors what is the future for them. (I've read their past annual reports - I personally think that it's a highly potential company to invest in the long run)

I like to quote Yang Amat Berbahagia Tun Mohamed Dzaiddin Abdullah, Chairman of Bursa Malaysia in the recent 21st Palm & Lauric Oils Conference

"Whether it is for the physical or futures markets, in managing volatility, mitigating risk factors and ultimately ensuring that the industry remains vibrant, price trends are important for palm oil players."

MALAYSIA is a melting pot. A lot of people still do not realize it yet