CHINA COMING DOWN? NO WAY!! - NIK ZAFRI



This is up to 2005...look at the figures..you all can calculate - can you not?


Once again, some speculators are trying to 'underestimate' China. Last time it was Dubai - now it goes further. The 'bubbly' thing again...there will be bubble in China? What would they think of next? Relive the decoupling theory?

Some people didn't read figures or not bothered with figures and I find this less surprising as these so-called forecasters are not from China. I do not know if the speculators have actually been in China to see for themselves what's happening - US bluechips are coming into China even GM besides than Hewlett Packard & Intel.

Memory serves - In 2009 - China's GDP almost 14% - and this surprised every major banks of the world!! - this year 2010 - it's gonna get BIGGER. The figures originally forecasted by "smart Alexes" were a lot lower and now - they are wrong and still wrong!

One thing I can tell you all that most developing East Asia countries like to stay 'below radar detection' - not to distract too much publicity. China is definitely one of them. They are actually much bigger (as big as Russia) than the formal economists estimation or calculations.

It would not be proper for me to say that China will stay strong in its growth; as well as to other EA countries as well. There may still be minor subprime mortgage crisis elements (I'm saying 'maybe') but China will emerge.

One thing I learn from China's economic aspirations is that the conventional economics 'supply and demand' + 'equilibrium' or 'elasticity' point of view still work on them - where there should be less government intervention (not that we do not need them at all) but to let the market correct by itself. I also share the following views :

a) that (accurate) data collection, analysis and action plan based on these datum are so important,

b) organizations must adopt true corporate governance principles - that is....transparency,

c) bribery must be reduced or better - eliminated!,

d) all taxes must be paid,

e) Work attitude need to be changed - not the system - the system is fine. Don't come out with good figures or window dressings to impress the top management or to get stimulus packages but come out with the REAL figures based on data collection & analysis.

f) Wireless technology/e-commerce/B2B/B2C and all the likes are assets not foes.

g) White Collar Crimes need to be reduced - not on the dumb ones/scapegoats/pawns but on the 'smart ones' abusing their skills

The death of the 'decoupling' theory?

By Conrad de Aenlle Published: January 25, 2008

Traders work on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange in New York, U.S., on Tuesday, Jan. 22, 2008. U.S. stocks pared their biggest decline since 2002 after the Federal Reserve's emergency rate cut helped mitigate concern the economy is slipping into recession. (Jin Lee/Bloomberg News)

No one can say how much has been lost by investors basing decisions on unproven strategies that work in theory, but the amount has grown significantly. As trillions of dollars were wiped off the value of global stocks this week, "decoupling" became the latest big idea to shrink dramatically when tested in the real world.

Decoupling holds that European and Asian economies, especially emerging ones, have broadened and deepened to the point that they no longer depend on the United States for growth, leaving them insulated from a severe slowdown there, even a fully fledged recession. Faith in the concept has generated strong outperformance for stocks outside the United States - until now.

As opinion began to solidify after the start of the year that a recession, or something close to it, was likely in the United States, stock prices accelerated their declines, with the selling intensifying early this week. Contrary to what the decouplers would have expected, the losses were greater outside the United States, with the worst experienced in emerging markets and such developed economies as Germany and Japan.

Exports make up especially large portions of economic activity in those places, but that was not supposed to matter anymore in a decoupled world because domestic activity was thought to be so robust.

Decoupling was all the rage early last year when international financial markets all but ignored the increasing turmoil in the U.S. economy and stock market. Investment advisers point out, however, that the segments of the U.S. economy that were showing wear and tear then were those to which the rest of the world would never be heavily exposed. That is no longer true, they say, and markets are responding accordingly.

"Decoupling is yesterday's story," Stuart Schweitzer, a global strategist at J.P. Morgan Private Bank, declared. "Last year, when the U.S. slowdown was driven almost entirely by housing, it made sense that the rest of the world kept right on going. Housing is a domestic story, plain and simple.

"The nature of the slowdown has changed in two key respects. The credit crunch that began in midsummer is not just a U.S. phenomenon; the rise in risk aversion is global and will have an impact on credit terms and availability everywhere. And we're finally seeing evidence that the U.S. job market is losing steam and consumer spending is slowing."

True believers in decoupling have ignored another theory that appears to be logically inconsistent with it, has been popular for far longer and, most important, has been shown to work in real life. Remember globalization?

"If anything, global interdependence of economies is rising, not falling," said Jeff Applegate, chief investment officer of Citi Global Wealth Management.

"The notion that the U.S. can go into recession with no negative knock-on effect in the rest of the world doesn't hold up."

Andrew Foster, head of equity research for Matthews International Capital, a specialist in Asian markets, contends that it is possible for globalization and decoupling to coexist. In fact, one gave rise to the other, he said. It was only through economic liberalization that the juggernaut economies of Asia were able to grow as fast as they have, allowing for the development of conspicuously consuming middle classes.

"The irony is that these economies are more coupled with the rest of the world than they ever were in the past," he said. "That's why they're so strong, and that has allowed them to become more independent."

The new Asian consumers may not be able to compensate for all of the exports that would be lost during an American recession, Foster said, but some of the companies that serve their needs might still do all right for themselves. The true decoupling may be not so much between the United States and the rest of the world as between segments of the global economy that cater to the burgeoning nouveau riche in emerging economies on one hand and most other commercial sectors on the other.

With the United States apparently tipping over into recession, Foster is looking to fill his Asia portfolios with the first type of businesses, as long as they have not been bid up to unreasonable levels already. A couple of pockets of opportunity that he finds are Chinese insurance companies and Indian health care providers.

"I like companies that don't derive their fortunes from products, services and especially commodities dominated by the global business cycle," he said, although he declined to furnish examples.

Valuation is also critical for Michael Avery, chief investment officer of Waddell & Reed and a professed believer in decoupling - up to a point. He noted that the concept began to pop into the heads of professional investors, including his, during the last U.S. recession, in 2001-2002, although it had not yet achieved buzzword status.

"A lot of people in our business were thinking about where the world was going to head in a post-9/11 environment," Avery recalled. "The U.S. economy had slowed dramatically in 2001, and you had places in the world like China and India that continued to grow at mid- to high single digits. That set in motion the thinking that the U.S. might not be the leading economic force going forward."

But while he accepts the basic idea of economic decoupling, he is not fanatical about it as an investment theme, at least not now. The emerging world will grow faster than the United States, in his view, but Avery doubts that sufficient growth can be achieved to justify the valuations being put on companies in those markets by the new wave of decoupling adherents.

"The big difference in 2002 is that not many people placed bets on that outcome, so there wasn't much risk," he said.

"Now I can go anywhere, and if I talk about China and India and the emerging middle class, they all nod their heads. It's a huge difference from five years ago."

Avery still finds value in some domestically oriented sectors in Asia, as well as in Middle Eastern markets that continue to benefit from one key export, crude oil. He noted that while exports to the United States of less viscous products may be at risk, the growth of middle-class spending is promoting a healthy expansion of trade within the emerging world.

Avery made a big bet on declining share prices late last year when he sold short derivative contracts tied to benchmark stock indexes. But his Ivy Asset Strategy Fund has substantial holdings in such plays on emerging-market domestic demand as the phone company China Mobile; Veolia Environnement, a French producer of water treatment systems, and Las Vegas Sands, an American hotel and casino operator expanding into Macao.

In addition to selling stock index futures, Avery has about 10 percent of his portfolio each in gold, cash and Treasury bonds as hedges against the uncertainties and jolts that would accompany a U.S. recession.

Tim Guinness, chairman and chief investment officer of Guinness Atkinson Asset Management, is another whose objection to decoupling is more a matter of how it works in practice.

"I'm a moderate decoupling believer," he acknowledged. "I'm in the camp that believes that China is rapidly moving from being dependent on exports to the U.S. to enjoying a virtuous circle of rapidly rising incomes for Chinese consumers and very strong momentum behind internally driven growth."

There is momentum in China's stock market, too, he noted, but in a different direction. Perhaps the biggest beneficiary of decoupling is giving back much of its enormous gains of the last few years as investors break faith with the concept.

"I prefer China, but not today," Guinness said. "The next few months will see a continued retreat in China-related stocks. The correction already has been very pronounced."

He prefers less bubbly stock markets in emerging economies where domestic demand is strong, like South Korea and Thailand. Individual stocks that he favors include PTT in Thailand, Singapore Petroleum and Cemig, a Brazilian hydroelectric company.

Applegate, at Citi, finds stocks better value than bonds. He particularly likes global banks and stocks in Europe and emerging markets generally, although he considers China and Hong Kong fairly pricey.

Bonds and equities have experienced sharply diverging fortunes recently. Many stock markets are more than 20 percent below their 2007 highs, while yields on government bonds have plummeted, sending their prices aloft.

Movements in both markets suggest that investors are factoring a global recession into their thinking, a development that could set the stage for the next rally in stocks and render the decoupling argument moot.

Another theory, with a proven track record, states that stocks should be bought once the economy is recognized to be in recession. By then, share prices account for all or most of the bad news, the authorities have taken steps to correct imbalances and a recovery is often imminent.

"Play the movie forward," Applegate said. "If the economy is going to soften globally, then can you expect more central bank policy response? The answer is a resounding yes."

In such conditions, he said, "you should have more of a preference for equities over bonds."

--------------------------------------------------

Nik Zafri's Comments : I've been saying it!!!

Hi everyone!!

It's been a while...dropping by to share a very good article which has caused me some delay in submitting a very important document to the client.

Luckily my client called me up to remind me...

---------------------------------------
Speeches, Testimony, Papers
Global Economic Prospects 2008/2009: Hoping for a Global Slowdown and a US Recession
by Michael Mussa, Peterson Institute

Paper presented at the thirteenth semiannual meeting on Global Economic Prospects
April 3, 2008

© Peterson institute for International Economics. All rights reserved.

Overview

After four years of average annual global real GDP growth of better than 4 1/2 percent, recent data indicate that the pace of advance is slowing in the major industrial countries, with the US economy on the verge of, and perhaps already in, outright recession. So far, the evidence points to less of a slowdown in other industrial countries, while most emerging-market economies appear likely to maintain quite strong, albeit somewhat slower, growth.

Meanwhile, world consumer price inflation (on a 12-month basis) is up from barely 2 percent seven years ago to nearly 5 percent as of February 2008. Among both industrial (except for Japan) and major emerging-market countries, inflation is now running at, or in most cases somewhat above, rates consistent with policy objectives. Driven by persistently rising global demand, commodity prices continue to surge upward across the board, especially measured in US dollars but also in terms of the rapidly appreciating euro.

In this situation, the world economy really needs what is now forecast for 2008/2009: a significant slowing of economic growth, down to 3.8 percent (year over year) in 2008 from 4.7 percent in 2007.1 This slowdown will be led by a decline of demand growth in the US economy, which is both pronounced and extends over a considerable period. Indeed, in view of the exceptionally aggressive easing of macroeconomic policies already in place in the United States and the likelihood of monetary policy remaining highly accommodative so long as US financial markets remain under stress, it is now desirable that real GDP growth for 2008 fall to a forecasted rate of barely more than 1 percent (year over year)—an outcome consistent with a very mild and brief recession. Reflecting some risk of a somewhat deeper and more prolonged recession in the United States, the growth forecast for 2009 (year over year) is set at 2 percent.

For the rest of the world, a mild US recession in 2008 will have a modest negative effect on real GDP growth, with more significant impacts in Mexico and Canada. In countries where the slowdown threatens to become excessive and inflation is under control, some easing of monetary and perhaps fiscal policy is both likely and appropriate. More generally, however, it is too soon to call for a general and significant easing of macroeconomic policies. A general slowdown in global economic growth is needed to cool the clearly apparent upsurge in worldwide inflation.

Some countries, including Australia, China, and Sweden, have recently tightened monetary policies in efforts to forestall inflation. Other countries, including Canada and the United Kingdom, have eased monetary policies modestly in response to weakening economic growth. Quite appropriately, however, no country has so far followed the lead of the Federal Reserve in aggressive monetary easing.

As the custodian of the world's second most important currency, the policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) is particularly noteworthy. Inflation in the euro area is running more than a percentage point above the ECB's announced objective. The euro area economy has recently been growing significantly more rapidly than its potential rate of about 1 1/2 percent. The unemployment rate has fallen half a percentage point below the minimum reached in the last expansion. Key monetary aggregates are surging at rates well above their desired target ranges. In this situation, one would normally have expected the ECB to have raised its key policy interest rate a further 100 basis points since last summer.

Instead, with financial turbulence spreading to some extent from the United States to euro area financial markets and institutions, with evidence that euro area economies are beginning to slow, and with a sharp appreciation of the euro against the dollar, which is likely to slow growth and impede inflation, the ECB has wisely held back from further interest rate increases. With the euro area economy now expected to expand by about 1 1/2 percent this year (in line with potential), the timing and direction of future adjustments in ECB interest rates remain—appropriately—dependent upon the evolving balance of risks for inflation and economic growth.

For Japan, the strengthening of the yen against the dollar in recent months and weakening of exports to the United States, together with likely weakness in domestic demand growth, suggest a further write-down in the forecast for real GDP growth for 2008 to 1.2 percent (from 1¾ percent forecast last October). This reflects the assumption that the surprising upsurge of GDP growth in the final quarter of 2007 will be partly offset in the first half of this year.

For the industrial countries as a group, real GDP growth this year is now forecast to be 1.5 percent, and growth for 2009 is projected to be moderately stronger at about 1.9 percent.

In emerging-market economies, circumstances vary and so do appropriate policies, but the general prospect is for continued quite strong economic growth, despite the slowdown in the industrial countries.

Is this "decoupling?" Not really. Mexico, Caribbean and Central American countries, and Asian economies that are particularly dependent on exports to the United States are already feeling and will continue to feel the effects of the US economic slowdown. More broadly, however, strong growth of domestic demand in many emerging-market economies will sustain reasonably strong GDP growth, and rising demand for raw materials by key emerging-market economies, most importantly China, will help keep commodity prices strong and aid growth in other emerging-market economies.

Overall, I forecast that growth for developing and emerging-market economies as a group this year will be about 6 1/2 percent, down from almost a 7 1/2 percent advance in 2007. For 2009, I now project slightly slower growth. The slowdown will be more severe, however, if growth in the industrial countries, especially the United States, turns out to be meaningfully below the present forecast. Exports from emerging-market countries would then be hit in volume terms, and prices of commodity exports could take a serious tumble. Some developing countries, especially among the primary commodity exporters, could face serious economic challenges and potential crises.

On this occasion, Arvind Subramanian is available to share his expertise on emerging-market economies, particularly in Asia and especially India. Accordingly, I will limit my remarks on these economies to selected observations on some key emerging-market countries. Then, in view of the departure from the Institute of my colleague Martin Baily and the (at least) temporary absence of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, I will turn to discuss growth prospects in the industrial countries, especially the United States. This should provide background for Morris Goldstein's more in-depth observations on the present financial crisis and proposals for reform.

Sustained Growth in Emerging Markets

China's economy continues to surge forward, so much so that the authorities are tightening policies to cool down inflation. Growth will likely slow from 11 1/2 percent last year to about 10 percent this year and next. On the policy front, the key action that should be taken—but that the Chinese authorities have so far refused—is a significant step appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar and in real effective terms, combined with policies to stimulate domestic demand.

In the rest of emerging Asia, growth will likely moderate somewhat in 2008 and 2009 but stay above 6 percent, with India continuing to grow at nearly 8 percent.

In Latin America, Mexico will suffer spillover effects from the slowing US economy, and growth this year is likely to fall to about 2 1/2 percent before recovering modestly in 2009. In contrast, Brazil should be able to sustain growth of nearly 5 percent, despite the strong appreciation of the real against the dollar. Growth in Argentina and Venezuela is expected to slow from the high rates of recent years, bringing down the growth rate for all of Latin America to about 4 1/2 percent this year and slightly less in 2009.

For Central and Eastern Europe, weak growth in Hungary and Turkey hurt regional performance in 2007 and partly offset strong results in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia. For 2008 and 2009, regional growth will likely run about 4 percent, reflecting partly the impact of slower growth in Western Europe.

In the Commonwealth of Independent States, the dominant Russian economy should continue to grow at about 7 percent, and growth rates will likely remain somewhat higher (on average) in the smaller economies.

For the Middle East, high oil prices will help keep growth strong in the energy-exporting countries. The larger and more diversified economies of Egypt and Israel should also maintain growth rates in the 5 percent range.

High commodity prices will continue to benefit many African countries, and growth in the region appears likely to continue at least at a 5 percent rate.

Slowing in Other Industrial Countries

Among the industrial countries other than the United States, growth will slow significantly from the 2 3/4 percent advance of 2007 to barely more than 1 1/2 percent this year. However, aside from the United States, I see significant risk of recession this year only in Japan and possibly Italy. The impact of the yen's recent appreciation and weakening of exports to the United States, together with deteriorating sentiment among Japanese businesses and consumers, could push GDP into a couple of quarters of negative growth, even if year-over-year growth remains slightly positive. And the Japanese policy authorities have little room to provide offsetting stimulus.

In Canada, growth this year will likely fall a little below 2 percent, under the impact of slowing US growth and a strong Canadian dollar. However, solid income growth from strong export revenues should keep domestic demand relatively robust, and the Canadian authorities have considerable room to ease policy should that appear needed to forestall very weak growth or recession.

In the United Kingdom, growth this year is also likely to slow to slightly less than 2 percent. But this is not entirely unwelcome in view of the need to curb inflationary pressures, and the Bank of England has plenty of room to ease further should that appear warranted. The Reserve Bank of Australia has continued to tighten in recent months and would surely welcome the forecasted slowing of growth to 3 percent this year.

In the euro area, as previously noted, the projected slowing of growth this year to 1.6 percent from 2.6 percent last year involves nothing more than slowing to the potential growth rate. The slowdown will affect all countries in the area. The Italian economy looks likely to be extremely sluggish and is at some risk of falling into recession. Growth should remain stronger in Germany, sustained by good export performance in the face of weaker consumer demand. France will lag slightly behind Germany, while Spain will slow considerably due to a sharp downturn in home building. The slowdown will probably be reflected in a small uptick in unemployment and will be unpopular with most politicians. However, with inflation running well above the ECB's tolerance rate of 2 percent, the central bank is likely to see the slowing of growth more as a solution than as a problem.

A Mild US Recession

Despite signs of increasing financial strains, the US economy achieved almost 5 percent annualized growth in the third quarter of last year. Economic data that became available through Christmas indicated that the economy was still expanding through November. The data since late December, however, suggest that economic activity has been no better than flat and probably modestly declining since very late last year. The economic data do not indicate an economy that is crashing into steep recession.

The three most recent monthly employment reports have shown small declines in private-sector jobs. Weekly initial unemployment claims have risen from around 300,000 to slightly over 350,000. Residential investment continues to decline. The boom in nonresidential construction appears to have peaked. Data on durable goods orders and shipments suggest weak or even declining business equipment investment. As should be expected in the face of falling home prices and household wealth, sharp increases in energy and food prices, and stagnating employment, real consumer spending has not increased since November—but it has not declined.

Net exports are probably continuing to improve, but this will not be enough to offset weakness in the other components of final demand. Annualized real GDP growth in the first quarter will likely be modestly negative—probably between minus one-half and minus one percent in the first quarter. (And, if there is a modestly positive result, it will probably reflect an upsurge in inventory investment, which is not a positive sign for future growth.)

The second quarter may see moderation in the pace of decline of residential investment, but the other elements of domestic demand are likely to remain weak. Another quarter of modestly negative real GDP growth now seems to be the most likely outcome. Whether this will be enough to persuade the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) to proclaim an official recession is not clear, but I would now put the likelihood of such a recession at over 50 percent.

By June, the tax cuts from the recently passed fiscal package will be flowing into consumers pockets, bumping up consumer spending mainly in the third quarter. Some, not unreasonable, forecasts suggest that the stimulus could induce as much as a 5 percent annualized gain of real consumer spending in the third quarter, implying a considerable temporary boost to GDP growth. My view is more restrained, partly because I expect that businesses will absorb some of any surge in consumption spending (particularly for durables) into reductions in inventories.

On the other hand, businesses have kept inventories quite lean for the past three years, and there is no indication of a general inventory overhang (aside from the stockpile of unsold homes, which is not counted in business inventories). Sharp declines of inventory investment into negative territory have been a feature of all ten postwar recessions. It is a positive sign that the magnitude of any inventory correction in the present episode appears likely to be limited.

In sum, the prospect is that with the benefit of the fiscal stimulus, the US economy will bounce back to moderately positive growth this summer. By then the massive contraction of residential investment, which began two years ago, should be complete—with new home building running just below one million units, less than half of its recent peak level. Growth of consumer spending is likely to be weak after the effects of the stimulus are spent, but inventory investment should bounce back, and net exports may be expected to continue to make positive contributions to GDP growth. During the second half of 2008, it is reasonable to expect growth to rebound to 2 to 3 percent.

The suggested pattern of modestly falling GDP in the first half and moderate rebound in the second half implies that real GDP will show a very meager advance of about one-half percent on a fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter basis. Year-over-year real GDP growth would be barely more than 1 percent. In comparison, in the 2001 recession—the mildest of the postwar era—fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter growth was 0.4 percent and year-over-year growth was 0.8 percent.

The 2001 recession was followed by an initially weak recovery, with real GDP growing at only a 1.7 percent rate during the six quarters after the official end of recession, and with the unemployment rate continuing to rise to a peak of 6.3 percent in May 2003. On this occasion, I expect that the economy will remain quite sluggish through 2009, with growth proceeding at about a 2 percent annual rate. Weak growth of consumer spending in the face of significant losses of household net worth associated with lower real home values will be the key reason for this sluggishness.

Partly offsetting weak consumer spending growth will be continued improvement in US net exports, reflecting both slow import growth and continued rapid export growth. With the usual lag, the substantial depreciation of the dollar over the past year will contribute to the improvement in US net exports in 2009 and beyond.

We see here what I earlier called "reverse coupling." From 1995 through 2004, relatively strong growth of domestic demand in the United States and the effects of a strong dollar (with lags extending this effect) led to persistent deterioration in US real net exports. Thus, the United States was exporting demand to the rest of the world at a time when domestic demand growth in the rest of the world was relatively sluggish.

This process has been operating in reverse since the summer of 2006. Slower domestic demand growth in the United States, combined with stronger demand growth abroad and the effects of a significantly weaker dollar, have begun to significantly improve US real net exports. Thus, during the past year and a half, the rest of the world economy has been helping to pull the US economy along. This process may continue for several years as consumer spending growth in the United States remains restrained by the effects of lower household wealth, making room for expanding the supply of US net exports without contributing to inflationary pressures in the United States. For this process to continue relatively smoothly, however, the rest of the world needs to sustain reasonably robust demand growth and the United States needs to avoid too sharp a decline in domestic demand. The adjustment of the foreign exchange value of the dollar, which is essential for this process, is now largely complete, except for the needed appreciations of some Asian currencies, most notably the Chinese renminbi.

Turmoil in Global Financial Markets

A key feature and source of uncertainty in the present economic situation is the continuing turmoil in financial markets, especially in the United States but with spillovers to Europe and to a limited extent (so far) to Japan and emerging markets. Global equity markets have sold off amidst the turmoil, but markets for credit instruments and financial institutions dealing in such instruments have been most affected.

Three issues concerning this financial-market turmoil deserve special attention:

(1) What has caused this financial turmoil, notwithstanding strenuous efforts by the Federal Reserve and other central banks to contain it?

(2) What risks does it pose to the global economy?

(3) Have the policy responses been adequate and appropriate?

Regarding the causes of the turmoil, it is noteworthy that it has been most severe in US financial markets and institutions. Europe and, to a lesser extent, Canada and Japan have also been affected. In these other countries, a few institutions (such as the mortgage lender Northern Rock in the United Kingdom) have gotten into trouble on their own, related to their domestic activities. But most of the problems faced by non-US institutions have arisen because of their involvement with financial instruments originating in the United States.

In the United States, the initial underlying difficulties arose from subprime mortgages and financial instruments involving such mortgages. However, the crisis is much broader and deeper and has gone on longer than can plausibly be explained by this underlying cause. Across quite a broad spectrum, credit markets have become illiquid and dysfunctional. Interest rate spreads relative to US Treasury obligations have shot up and remained high and volatile even for higher-quality credits. Markets for important classes of bundled instruments have frozen up, and values for some of these instruments—to the extent that they can be determined—have plummeted. All this turmoil, well beyond what can plausibly be explained by developments in the real economy, indicates that financial markets and institutions themselves are mainly responsible for the crisis.

The extent of this crisis in credit markets is even more remarkable in view of the exceedingly aggressive actions taken by the Federal Reserve and the important but less aggressive actions of other leading central banks. Contrary to the nonsense spoken by many financial-market commentators, the Federal Reserve has not been "behind the curve" in its policy response. In fact, the easing of US monetary policy in the present possible recession has far outstripped the pace of easing in past actual recessions. On top of this, the Federal Reserve has recently taken truly extraordinary actions to extend specific liquidity support to a wide range of US financial institutions.

The official explanation for these extraordinary actions is not that they are motivated primarily by the desire to protect financial institutions from losses but rather to head off the risk of major damage to the general economy spreading from difficulties in the financial sector. So far, however, there is little indication that the general economy is suffering much damage from the credit market turmoil—beyond some deepening of the downturn in US residential investment. In particular, the present slowdown in the US economy and around the world is not much more than what we would normally have expected in view of falling home values, higher food and energy prices, and other developments aside from the turmoil in credit markets.

Does this imply that the Federal Reserve, in its efforts to protect the financial sector, has overreacted to the credit market turmoil? Has it eased too aggressively, unduly raising the risk of inflation down the road? Has its rescue of the financial sector by cutting massively the cost of funds and the provision of specific liquidity support generated far too much moral hazard relative to the value of the protective effect of these actions against real hazards faced by the general economy?

At this point, the answers to these questions are not entirely clear, but two conclusions can be reached with high confidence. First, given the massive easing already undertaken by the Federal Reserve and the likelihood of some modest further easing, the US economy now needs to undergo at least a near recession if the Federal Reserve's easing is not to be excessive. Second, if the Federal Reserve's highly aggressive actions have really been warranted to protect the economy from substantial harm, then deep reforms of the financial system, including the Federal Reserve's policies and practices, are clearly needed to reduce the likelihood of such problems in the future. The Federal Reserve cannot pose only as the hero riding to the rescue of the economy and the financial system. Its role as one of the villains whose earlier actions and inactions contributed to the present crisis needs to be fully and carefully assessed.


Table 1 Real GDP growth projections as of April 3, 2008 (percent change, year over year)




Note

1. The figures for global GDP growth are aggregated from the growth rates for individual countries using purchasing power parity (PPP)–based measures of exchange rates employed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its World Economic Outlook (WEO). Based on a major study supported by the World Bank, estimates of PPP exchange rates have recently been substantially revised, with the general result that the weights in world GDP of the industrial countries have been somewhat increased while those of emerging-market economies have been correspondingly reduced. Because emerging-market economies, most notably China and India, have been growing far more rapidly than most industrial countries in recent years, the effect of the revision in PPP exchange rates is to lower the figure for global growth (without changing growth rates for individual countries) by about 1/2 percentage point. Thus the present estimate for global growth of 4 3/4 percent in 2007 under the new PPP-based exchange rates corresponds to an estimate of 5 1/4 percent growth under the old weights. The weights used in table 1 are estimates of the weights that the IMF will use for the forecast to be reported in the current WEO.
---------------------------------------
RESPONSE FROM MELBOURNIAN AND COUNTER-RESPONSE FROM NIK ZAFRI - IN GLOBAL MALAYSIAN FORUM

Melbournian : A very lengthy analysis that echos familiar cliche from "soft-landers". My only comment is that there are two important factors that seems to be absent from his presentation: ie the component of human emotion and the lack of accountability in the derivative instruments that are prevalent in recent years. The health of credit market depends un-surprisingly on market "credibility". Quite akin to the railroad stock bubble and the (in)famous tulip futures fiascos in the past , the total sum of global derivatives todays seems to have exceeded the true intrinsic values of the actual goods and services that these instruments are supposed to underpin. Laws of conservation and Newton's principle of inertia are no longer relevant. No longer can one confidently say for sure that one man's gains equal in exactitude to another's losses. Containment ? Lets hope and pray.

Nik Zafri :

Hi Melbournian, I must say that I'm impressed!

This research seem to miss out "CCI" (Consumer Confidence Index) which I think suitably describes what you meant by 'human emotion' in the context of economics. (it's obvious isn't it....the article is touching on 'purchasing power', 'manpower', business surroundings - which are all linked to the CCI)

Surprisingly I have also discovered that the Global CCI have always been missing (in fact seldom being measured) But; in US; it will suddenly 'appear' during proposal to hike interest rates by the Feds - hence one of the main indicators to the performance of the stock market worldwide.

I can understand why the CCI is sometimes there and sometimes not there...it's because of the big variance between one country to another. CCI is suppose to be the consumption indicator for GDP.

Lack of accountability on derivative instruments

What you have said - coincidentally reminding me of the core of Management - it is said that :

"Responsibility is a derivative of authority and accountability is a derivative of responsibility"

It's a paradox - I do not know if there is any connection.

Anyway, in this case, the derivative instrument (to the accounting standards esp. balance sheet) becomes a concern when it involve hedging and embedded derivatives (contract) - to determine of whether they (derivatives) are liabilities or asset. Otherwise positioning of finance and determining the derivatives value cannot be accurately achieved.

I'm not a qualified accountant but I do know the affects of hedging either the normal fair value, cashflow or currency. Now? As you said and I would to agree to it that most accounting (and auditing) bodies (even in Malaysia) are 'shouting' demanding accountability but again, it is easier said than done unless further education to include hedging activities and the volatility behind them in the context of derivatives are developed further.

Yes, breaking every rule in the book is now trendy!! It is also the reason why I am really interested in the concept of Knowledge-Based Economy and Knowledge Management but of course these two terms are moulded according to my style of intepretation - in short my experience. At times, I never trust figures, data and statistics but I use my instincts to make decisions.

Finally quoting you : "Let's Pray and Hope"

This is one of the 'wake-up' call article.

--------------------------------------------------------
The Sun Makin Sens Section - by Tan Siok Choo

East Asia - no longer a follower?

THAT the US appears to be sliding into a recession cannot be denied. What is uncertain is whether East Asia in general, and Malaysia in particular, can avoid following in its wake. While it may be premature to offer a definitive answer to this question, three separate indicators underscore export-dependent East Asia’s growing resilience.

First, a recent article by Bloomberg suggests Japan may escape the recession that appears to be engulfing the US. As one of the world’s largest financial news and data provider notes, since 1970, Japan has followed the US into all five recessions. In 1970, the US accounted for 30% of Japan’s exports. Today, that figure has fallen to only 20%.

Japan’s reduced economic dependence on the US is largely due to the success of manufacturing companies like Toyota in capitalising on buoyant markets, particularly in China and other countries. In the past two years, Japan’s exports to China jumped by 45% while those to Russia doubled.

Additionally, a 5.6% drop in US vehicle sales didn’t stop Toyota’s total unit sales from rising in the first quarter. Furthermore, Toyota is poised to overtake the US-based General Motors as the world’s largest auto company in terms of sales.

Last month, two usually bearish brokers on Japan – Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley – backed off from predictions that the world’s second largest economy will go into a recession this year. The catalyst for both brokers’ changed view was because revised industrial production figures for February showed output rose to a record rather than fell, the Bloomberg article says.

Even though exports could slow down, corporate Japan is now financially stronger than when its stock and property bubble burst in the late 1980s. The average ratio of corporate liabilities to assets has dropped to about 65%, the lowest level since 1955 from about 80% in the mid-1990s, the Merrill Lynch report says.

Moreover, Japanese companies have soaked up excess production capacity. Reduced debt and streamlined production will enhance corporate Japan’s capability to withstand a slump in the US, Bloomberg notes.

Second, the price of oil has continued its inexorable climb to a record high, even though its biggest market appears to be softening. Last in electronic trading last Friday, US crude futures for June delivery hit an intra-day record of US$126.20 (RM403.84) a barrel.

Admittedly, the escalating price of oil this year may be prompted by concern about possible disruptions in continued supply in countries like Nigeria and Venezuela. That prices continue to skyrocket despite sharply declining demand from the US, the world’s largest consumer of oil, is unusual. In February this year, US demand for oil fell to 19.7 million barrels of oil a day, down by one million barrels from last year’s average.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) says oil use worldwide will increase 2% this year because of growing demand in emerging markets. For the first time this year, emerging markets will consume more crude oil than the US, the IEA notes. Emerging markets will consume 20.67 million barrels of oil a day, an increase of 4.4%. In contrast, demand in the US will contract by 2% to 20.38 million barrels daily.

"The US recession will be a footnote as far as the oil market is concerned. Supply isn’t growing and demand is growing robustly in the developing world," says Jeffrey Rubin, chief economist at CIBC World Markets in Toronto who has correctly forecast higher oil prices since 2000.

Third, shipments of personal computers (PC) grew at a double-digit pace worldwide in the first quarter despite anaemic growth in the US, technology research firm, IDC says. Indeed, global figures for the first quarter exceeded its forecast.

Although growth in US sales slowed to around 3%, overseas gains boosted global first quarter PC shipments 14.6%, IDC notes. That’s because the US accounted for 23% of global shipments in the first quarter compared with 25% a year ago.

"Even if there is a particularly bad US market, it is becoming a smaller piece of the global puzzle," IDC vice-president Bob O’Donnell points out.

Despite these positive indicators, East Asia’s growing resilience cannot be equated with total independence from the US economy.

For a start, if the US economy is in recession, it may take months before the impact is transmitted to East Asia. Additionally, in an increasingly interlinked global economy – particularly in financial markets – it is inconceivable that what happens in the US can be ring-fenced from other emerging economies.

But if the inconceivable does happen – if the US sinks into recession and if East Asia succeeds in decoupling from the world’s largest economy – then a new era in global economic history may have begun.

A good article from The Globalist Dot Com where I'm one of the subscriber.

Nik
---------------------------------
Acknowledging China By Jianxiong Zhang | Thursday, February 28, 2008

China's economic boom of the last three decades has raised concerns about resource scarcity, pollution and trade. While China's development has made it one of the world's largest economies, hundreds of millions still live in poverty. Jianxiong Zhang argues that the United States and the European Union must acknowledge China's efforts to address climate change and trade disputes.

In the context of globalization, the economy increasingly influences international relations. This is because strengthening interdependence and intensifying frictions between economies tend to go hand-in-hand. As a result, it is no wonder China is worried about the impacts on its relations with the United States and the European Union.

The scale of China's growth

It is well-known that China's economy has been growing at an average rate over 9% for 27 years now. And, in the past five years, its annual growth rate exceeded 10%.

In 2006, China’s GDP reached $2.6 trillion (in purchasing power terms), or 5% of the world total — ranking fourth in the world.

Growth and poverty

China’s development is as an evolutionary stage, rather than an obstacle to its relations with the United States and European Union.

China has reached the top ranks of economies in the world by GDP — but it still lags behind 109 other countries in terms of per capita income.

China needs to further develop, so as to improve the living standards of its citizens, allowing them to enjoy a life comparable to that in medium-developed countries.

This is their right — and indeed one of their fundamental human rights.

Supporting the world economy

The continual growth in China makes significant contributions to the world economy. Firstly, China’s economy contributed 13.8% of the global GDP growth during the 2003-2005 period.

The rate is second only to that of the United States. That is to say, with China’s continued growth, the world economy will not substantially slide down even if the U.S. economy falls into recession.

Benefits from China

China needs to further develop, so as to improve the living standards of its citizens. This is their right — and indeed one of their fundamental human rights.

Second, cheap goods exported from China are helpful to prevent inflation in its trading partners. Third, the fruits of economic growth in China are shared by industrialized countries in general — and in the United States and the European Union in particular.

They receive a great deal of profits from their place in the international division of labor, and gain significant returns from their financial services, foreign direct investment and patent income from China.

For example, about 20% of revenues from each mobile phone, 30% from each computer and 30-40% from numerically controlled machine tools made in China go to investors or patent owners in the United States, the European Union or other countries.

Concerns from abroad

Kind-hearted people in the rest of the world are happy to see and hail the economic progress in China, for it helps millions of people there escape from poverty. Thus, it brings new impetus to economic growth globally.

However, the United States and Europe are very concerned about the consequences of China’s development. Apart from positive expectations, they wonder what negative impacts China’s development will have on them.

Managing growth

Kind-hearted people in the rest of the world hail the economic progress in China, for it helps millions of people there escape from poverty.

For instance, they wonder whether China will compete for natural resources, energy and markets with them

— and to what extent China’s development will lead to pollution and climate change. A more extreme observation even views China’s development as a “threat.”

As regards climate change, it should be noted that Beijing has already set about tackling the problem.

The Chinese government pursues a policy of “scientific development” and carries out programs to build China into a resource-conserving society, which contain a series of measures to save resources and energy.

Resources in historical perspective

From 1990 to 2005, the energy consumption per thousand dollars of GDP was cut from 2.19 to 1.17 tons of coal equivalent, with an annual reduction rate of 4.1%. This figure, however, as well as greenhouse gases emissions per unit of GDP in China, is still higher than those in the United States and the European Union.

This is largely because the United States and the European Union have been in the post-industrialized stage (where more than 70% of GDP is contributed by service sectors), while China is still in the industrializing stage (where almost half of GDP comes from the industrial sector). This can be changed only by further development — and the change is under way at an accelerating pace.

Tackling climate change

Between close trading partners, disputes are a normal phenomenon. This should not be a factor to undermine relations between them.

The Chinese government set the targets of bringing down energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20%, cutting the total discharge of major pollutants by 10% and increasing forest cover from 18.2% to 20% between the end of 2005 and 2010.

The National Program on Tackling Climate Change released in May 2007 formulates that, by 2010, China will cut CO2 emissions by one billion tons through improving technologies and replacing fossil fuels with renewable energies.

If international cooperation in developing greenhouse gas zero-discharge technologies can be accelerated, the impacts of China’s development on climate change will be further minimized.

The rights of the poor

As for the equitable distribution of energy, as well as natural resources and markets, this matter requires bilateral or multilateral consultations. Such consultations must be carried out on an equal basis.

In this process, two issues should be considered. One is the development right of poor countries. There are quite a few countries in the world where people live a life far below the living standards of industrialized countries.

A sense of equity

If international cooperation in developing greenhouse gas zero-discharge technologies can be accelerated, the impacts of China’s development on climate change will be further minimized.

When distributing the world's resources, rich countries should give more considerations to the interests and rights of poor countries. Up to now, the per capita income in China is just equal to 4.5% of that in the United States, 5% of that Japan, 5.8% of that in the eurozone and 10% of that in South Korea.

There are still 135 million people in China who live on less than $1 per day. There are 750 million such people in the world, of which China accounts for 18%.

The other issue is the principle of equality. According to the World Bank, the 2000 per capita consumption of energy was 3.8 tons of oil in the euro zone, 8.2 tons in the United States — while just 0.9 ton in China. The per capita consumption of energy in the United States is nine times that in China.

Measuring China's growth

At the same time, the per capita rate of CO2 emissions in China was two tons, compared with eight tons in the eurozone and 21 tons in the United States. In 2004, the per capita CO2 emissions in China increased to four tons.

This figure, however, was only 87% of the world average — and 33% of the OECD average.

Accepting disputes, improving relations

Along with China’s development, the trade disputes between it and the United States as well as the European Union are on the rise. Between close trading partners, disputes are a normal phenomenon. This should not undermine relations between them.

The economic structure of China can be changed only by further development — this is happening at an accelerating pace.

Trade disputes occur between the United States and the European Union, the United States and Japan, as well as the European Union and Japan. Since its inception, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been mostly used to deal with disputes between the United States and the European Union. The disputes, however, have never undermined the bilateral relationship.

In short, the contributions of China’s development are a net plus — even in light of its negative influences on the rest of the world. The negative effects brought about by development are controllable.

China’s development should be taken as an evolutionary process, rather than an obstacle to its relations with the United States and European Union.
----------------------------------
Here's something better from China Daily

China is not decoupling from US Economy
(Agencies)
Updated: 2008-01-21 10:14

BEIJING - China's central bank on Sunday poured cold water on the idea that the country's economy can decouple from the United States.

China's exports will be badly hit if US consumption weakens, Zhang Tao, deputy head of the international department of the People's Bank of China, told a financial forum.

Figures due this week are expected to show that China's gross domestic product grew more than 11 percent in the fourth quarter of 2007 from a year earlier, despite a deepening US credit crunch.

But Zhang said he saw mounting risks to US consumer demand. He noted that retail sales unexpectedly fell 0.4 percent in December, while property prices were falling and rising petrol prices were crimping disposable incomes.

"If US consumption really comes down, that's bad news for us," Zhang said. "That will have a pretty severe impact on our exports."

Wang Jian, head of the China Society of Macroeconomics, agreed that China's growing trade with Europe was unlikely to insulate it from a drop in exports to the United States.

If US demand weakened, Europe would export less to America and, in turn, would buy less from China, Wang said.

"Global demand is ultimately driven by the United States," he said.

More US interest rate cuts or a further fall in the dollar in response to a weakening economy would have an impact on Chinese monetary policy, Zhang said without elaborating.

He said the subprime crisis would not divert China from the path of financial innovation.

"It will not change our general direction. However, it serves as a warning that we need to pay attention to risk controls and launch new businesses in a steady, orderly way," he said.

Dai Genyou, director of the central bank's credit bureau department, said higher Chinese interest rates would have little impact on the ability of companies to service their debts. Nor would they derail corporate investment plans, Dai said.