Temporary Steel Canopy Collapse at RUB 16, ECRL – My Observations and Reflections

Note: I had always hoped to contribute to the project, but unfortunately there was no response from the relevant CCCC/ECRL parties to whom I had emailed my CV and company profile.

About 3.8 km from where I live, at around 2.00 pm, a temporary steel canopy structure on the ECRL project collapsed. I happened to be in KL at the time, so I couldn’t visit the location, but after reviewing a video, several photos, and initial news reports, I managed to get a reasonable sense of what had occurred. Our chat group immediately lit up with amazement and theories. I had to smile when someone said, “It just fell by itself.” Even if it looked that way, every structural failure has root causes that must be examined.

Most importantly, I breathed a huge sigh of relief that no one was hurt or killed. It is almost a miracle that the woman driving the Suzuki Swift escaped completely unharmed.

1) My "Initial Assessment"

Based on the available video frames, the collapse appears to be a progressive structural failure, not a sudden, unexplained fall. The sequence clearly shows the canopy tilting from one side first, indicating an asymmetric loss of support, which typically marks the beginning of instability in temporary works.

Temporary structures such as steel canopies depend heavily on proper bracing, anchorage, sequencing, and balanced load distribution. Any deviation, whether due to dismantling, improper tightening of bolts, or uneven settlement, can immediately turn the structure unstable.

2) Key Observations

• Initial Leaning: One support frame appears to have tilted first, suggesting possible failure at the base, bolt connections, or removal of key members,

• Asymmetric Load Transfer: Once one side lost stability, the remaining members likely experienced overload, leading to a chain-reaction failure.

• No External Impact: There is no sign of vehicle collision or crane contact, pointing toward internal structural or procedural issues.

• High Sensitivity of Temporary Works: Factors such as ground settlement, inadequate lateral bracing, vibrations from passing vehicles, or premature component removal can all contribute to collapse.

Taken together, these early indicators point toward issues such as procedural non-compliance, premature dismantling, inadequate bracing, or support failure.

3. Possible Root-Cause Hypothesis (Based on Visual Evidence Only)

Immediate Cause (Most Likely) - loss of stability in one of the temporary support frames possibly from:

• bolt loosening

• base settlement

• removal of a key structural member

• failure of a brace or joint

4. Contributing Factors

• Improper or unsafe dismantling sequence (this depends on whether the authority have approved the dismantling of temporary structures at the point of incident or otherwise) Fatigue or corrosion in bolts and connectors can also be the case, if the temporary structure overstayed its intended duration

• Insufficient lateral bracing,

• Vibrations from traffic below

• Inadequate supervision or communication

• Human error, such as removing the wrong component

5. Underlying Causes

• Weakness in the temporary works design or review,

• Missing or insufficient inspection procedures (torque checks, level checks, bracing checks),

• Deviation from the approved method statement (AMS)

6. What It Likely Was NOT

• Not caused by road users

• Not due to a collision

• Not a spontaneous collapse with no cause

7. Conclusion

The evidence points toward a preventable collapse resulting from instability in temporary supports combined with procedural or sequencing issues during dismantling.

8. Additional Technical Considerations

When I first reviewed the video, several failure possibilities became immediately noticeable:

• Inadequate Lateral Bracing - Temporary structures depend heavily on lateral restraint. Missing or weak bracing can allow swaying or buckling even under minor forces,

• Wind Load Underestimation,,

• Temporary structures often overlook lateral or uplift forces from wind. Even a brief gust can destabilize a lightly braced canopy,

• Base or Foundation Instability - Temporary supports often sit on pads or jacks. Soft soil, uneven settlement, or minor shifting can cause a tilt that progressively worsens,

8.1 Connection Failure

Bolts, welds, or connectors may fail due to:

• fatigue,

• improper tightening,

• corrosion,

• prolonged exposure beyond intended duration

• Load Reversal / Unplanned Loads - If a crane lift or material shift occurred nearby, the structure may have been subjected to forces not accounted for in the temporary works design.

8.2 Sequential Collapse

• Once one member fails, loads redistribute. Temporary structures with low redundancy often collapse rapidly once the first critical point gives way.

9. What Should Be Investigated Further

Authorities should look into:

• Baseplates and jack supports for signs of settlement or lateral displacement,

• Failed bolts and connections for metallurgical or fatigue analysis,

• Presence, adequacy, and installation quality of lateral bracing,

• Historical wind data at the moment of collapse,

• Compliance with the temporary works design and approved dismantling sequence

• Recent activity: Was any component removed earlier that day? Was there lifting or shifting nearby?

• Even small displacements, if unrestrained, can lead to progressive collapse.

10. My Likely Scenario

A plausible explanation is:

• The canopy lacked sufficient lateral bracing or had weakening components (fatigue, corrosion, or loose bolts),

• A brace, joint, or connection failed-possibly suddenly, possibly gradually.

• Load paths shifted, overstressing other members.

• The base or frame on one side leaned, lost stability, and initiated a tipping or folding sequence.

• Without adequate restraint or redundancy, the structure collapsed under its own weight or a minor lateral force.

This aligns with what we see in the video: a tilt, followed by progressive collapse.

11. Lessons and Recommendations

• Always design temporary works for worst-case wind and lateral loads,

• Use independent checks for bracing, connections, and anchorage,

• Conduct regular inspections, especially for older or long-standing temporary structures,

• Enforce strict sequencing during erection and dismantling.

• Use tie-backs or guy wires for tall or slender temporary canopies.

• Monitor and verify ground conditions, base supports, and torque on all key connections.

----------- DOSH stated that the temporary steel canopy which crashed onto a moving car along the MRR2 likely collapsed after being struck by a skylift boom during inspection work. According to their statement, the subcontractor, Wuhan Construction Sdn. Bhd., was carrying out a paint-thickness inspection when the skylift boom impacted the canopy.

While I agree with DOSH’s preliminary findings, I believe the full investigation is still ongoing and rightly so. Their explanation identifies the trigger, but in structural engineering, the trigger is rarely the root cause.

A skylift boom striking a structure can indeed cause local failure if the structure is already vulnerable. However, a properly designed, adequately braced, and securely anchored temporary canopy should not collapse catastrophically from a single accidental knock.

This suggests the skylift impact was the initiating event, but the structure likely had pre-existing weaknesses, making it susceptible to sudden instability.

In other words, the skylift boom was almost certainly the final trigger not the sole cause.

It is important to wait for the complete forensic investigation, which should examine: bracing configuration, bolt tightness, condition, and possible fatigue, wind load history, vibration exposure from heavy traffic, dismantling or inspection sequence, adequacy of temporary works design, supervision and procedural compliance.

A safe temporary structure is expected to withstand a minor accidental impact. If it collapses instantly, it indicates that the system was already compromised.

-------

Would this be right?

1) Wuhan Construction was carrying out paint-thickness inspection.
2) Workers were in the skylift cage, raised near the steel canopy.
3) During positioning or movement, the boom or basket made contact with the canopy.
4) If the canopy had weak bracing or loose joints, it failed upon impact.
The structure dropped onto the road below.

But again :

A properly designed temporary canopy should withstand minor accidental impact (this is industry norm).

So if a small collision caused total collapse, the deeper root causes may be:

- inadequate temporary works design
- missing or weak bracing
- poor joint tightening
- corrosion/weakening
- improper erection
- lack of supervision or approval for temporary works

The skylift may be the trigger, not the reason.

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READ BETWEEN THE LINES

When I go on site for an audit & see a worker without a safety helmet, will ask him/her to stop and then turn to the supervisor: Was there proper induction? Did the worker understand it? Is there documented information? That’s where the real issue lies. To blame the worker is reactive/firefighting when the root cause usually points to missing documentation, poor induction, or lack of understanding. In that sense, the responsibility falls on the supervisor, not the worker. My point is simple. Sometimes we see the immediate fault as the root cause when the real root cause is elsewhere

URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN THE NAME OF PROGRESS

Urban redevelopment is often viewed through the lenses of land titles, planning approvals, and economic value. But on the ground, the impact is far more human than technical.

When long-standing kampung communities are relocated, the loss is not merely physical. It dismantles multi-generational social networks, informal economies, caregiving structures, and the sense of safety that comes from knowing every neighbour by name. These are intangible yet critical assets almost always missing from feasibility reports and EIA submissions.

Compensation and relocation plans may meet procedural requirements, yet still fall short of replacing what residents truly lose:

a) continuity for the elderly,

b) stability for children,

c) decades of home improvements,

d) and livelihoods sustained within the community ecosystem.

From a governance and planning perspective, development should not only prioritise land efficiency or compliance. It must incorporate social impact assessments, genuine community engagement, and transition frameworks that minimise displacement trauma, practices that, unfortunately, are rarely implemented meaningfully.

Sustainable development is not purely about infrastructure, it is fundamentally about people.

This is not an anti-development stance. It is a call to ensure that promises are honoured. Too often, after projects begin, terms change under the justification of rising construction costs, additional variation works, or “unforeseen conditions” - and communities are pressured to accept new terms they never agreed to. Influence and power should never override fairness and integrity.

Progress becomes meaningful only when the transformation of land results in the upliftment of lives, not the displacement of them.

FROM BUTTONS TO TOUCHSCREENS : A GENERATION'S JOURNEY THROUGH THE WIRELESS REVOLUTION

There was a time when technology felt solid, mechanical, and reassuringly simple. Phones had physical buttons or rotary dialing, televisions needed an antenna that never pointed the right way, and computers hummed loudly as they worked. For those of us born in the 60s, we grew up in an era where posting a letter was faster than downloading a file, a camera needed film, and a “mobile phone” looked like something carried by army officers, not teenagers. The Internet, when it finally arrived, screeched through dial-up modems, and a single webpage could take minutes to load.

Yet within one lifetime, everything changed.

From the first time we saw an infrared beam blinking between two Nokia phones, to watching Bluetooth quietly replace cables, to connecting our homes through WiFi, cloud storage, and seamless broadband, we have lived through one of the most dramatic technological transformations in human history. What once felt like futuristic ideas from Star Trek and Star Wars have quietly slipped into our daily routines. Today’s youth grow up with touchscreens before they learn to read, Internet access before they learn the meaning of “offline,” and wireless earbuds that deliver crystal-clear audio without a single wire to untangle.

Behind all this “effortless magic” lies decades of hard science. Capacitive touchscreens measure tiny electrical shifts beneath the glass. Bluetooth devices speak to each other through low-energy radio waves hopping 1,600 times per second. WiFi blankets entire homes with invisible connectivity. Infrared communication, once the king of short-range data transfer, has long been replaced by high-speed networks, NFC payments, and AI-driven ecosystems. What once required bulky machines, endless cables, and complex instructions now fits into a device that slips into the pocket of a 12-year-old.

But technology didn’t just evolve, we evolved with it.

Those of us who typed on typewriters now type on virtual keyboards. We replaced stacks of photo albums with digital galleries. We traded cassette tapes for streaming services where millions of songs sit patiently in our phones. We moved from encyclopedias to search engines, from pen-pal letters to instant messaging across continents. And somehow, despite the rapid pace of change, we adapted, learned, and continued moving forward, proving that curiosity doesn’t age.

As we step deeper into an era of artificial intelligence, mixed reality, smart homes, and seamless wireless ecosystems, it’s impossible not to feel both humbled and amazed. What the younger generation sees as normal, we still recognise as extraordinary. Because we remember the world before the “swipe,” before the “tap,” before the “pairing,” and certainly before the “WiFi.”

And maybe that’s our unique advantage, we appreciate every convenience with a sense of wonder.

AGEISM: A Subtle Contradiction in the Workplace

As a former Human Resource Manager, I’ve always understood the value of experience yet, in my early 50s, I’ve faced the same subtle (and sometimes not-so-subtle) barriers, age as a deciding factor, even when my knowledge in technology and leadership far exceeds that of younger candidates.

I recall an interview for a senior position where a young colleague cynically implied we were competing for the same role. I had to clarify that I was applying for a more senior position than him and yet, I didn’t get the job. Likely due to ageism.

Meanwhile, another troubling pattern emerges where - society encourages the elderly to accept being “too old,” “senile,” or “useless,” even "forced" to set up their own organization or business.

Ageism is literally age discrimination, quietly happening across industries, even in places where older leadership is fully accepted, or even preferred.

Double Standards in Leadership vs Employment

It’s ironic, Prime Ministers, Ministers, Directors, Chairmen, CEOs, many serve past 60 or 70 with no questions about their capacity.

Yet in corporate hiring, especially for middle-management or technical roles, candidates above 50 often face subtle or direct age filters.

Question: If age doesn’t disqualify someone from running a country or agency, why does it disqualify them from a managerial or specialist role?

Ageism Disguised as “Polite” Questions

Many have faced this in interviews:

“What year did you graduate?”

“How many years of experience do you have?”

“Are you able to adapt to new technology?”

These questions are coded ways to guess age. In many countries, they’re recognized as covert age discrimination, but in Malaysia, they are often normalized due to lack of explicit legal protection in private sector hiring.

Older Leaders vs Older Employees

Companies often think differently:

- Leadership roles: value experience, networks, reputation

- Operational/technical roles: wrongly assume age = lower speed, less adaptability, shorter runway

Reality: People in their 50s and 60s often bring stability, loyalty, institutional memory, and strategic thinking younger teams lack. They also job-hop less and deliver consistent results.

Institutionalized Age Bias in Financial Institutions

When banks limit loans up to age 58, it sends a message:

“After this age, you’re too risky, even if healthy, employed, and capable.”

Policies like this reinforce ageism, despite life expectancy now being 75–80 and many people working beyond 60.

The Bottom Line

Yes - this is discrimination.

No - it’s not justified by data.

And yes - it contradicts the way governments and corporations celebrate older leaders at the top while ignoring older talent at the ground level.

Age should be seen as an asset, not a limitation.

HARD TALK

When people have no choice, they turn to online moneylenders. Despite high interest or scammers demanding fees, many take the risk. Banks know this issue but do little, imposing age limits even on healthy individuals, slowly pushing them further into financial hardship.

HIGHLAND TOWERS TRAGEDY REVISITED

Credit : Astro Awani

Disclaimer

This article is a technical synthesis prepared for informational and educational purposes only. All explanations, timelines, interpretations, and engineering assessments in this document are derived from open and publicly accessible sources, including news reports, academic papers, task‑force summaries, legal documents, and published case studies.

This article does not represent, quote, or replace any official government report, forensic investigation report, or authoritative findings issued by relevant Malaysian agencies, professional bodies, or courts.

The analysis is prepared from a civil, structural, and geotechnical engineering perspective, with supplementary notes on regulatory and administrative processes, strictly for general understanding. It may simplify or generalize certain technical aspects and should not be used as a substitute for professional engineering judgement, legal advice, or regulatory compliance.

While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, errors or omissions may exist, and interpretations may differ from official positions. Any use of any contents derived from this article is at the reader’s own discretion and responsibility.

Block 1 of the Highland Towers condominium (Ulu Klang, near Bukit Antarabangsa) collapsed on 11 December 1993 after a large, retrogressive landslide behind the building pushed the foundations and destroyed a retaining structure, the slide was the product of hillside clearance/over-development, failed drainage/diversion works and inadequate slope design/maintenance. 48 people died

1) Short timeline/Project Background

Highland Towers was built in phases in the 1970s–early 1980s at the foot of a steep, terraced hill in Taman Hillview / Ulu Klang. Block 1 (the southern block) is the one that collapsed.

In the early 1990s the Bukit Antarabangsa hilltop behind Highland Towers was developed (new roads, houses and earthworks). That development involved extensive cutting, vegetation removal and installation of diversion/drainage works (the “East Stream” diversion pipe is repeatedly mentioned in accounts). Heavy/repeated rain in December 1993 then triggered progressive slope failure. 

On 11 Dec 1993 the down-slope movement and failure of retaining works/earth mass undermined the piled foundations/rail-pile system behind Block 1; the block moved, fractured and collapsed. Rescue recovered 2 survivors and 48 fatalities.

2) Possible Engineering and Technical Root Causes

Several post-incident theories (later refuted) theorized that:

wastewater and greywater did not discharge properly into designated drains, leading to seepage and percolation into the subsurface soils behind Block 1. Over time, this may have softened the foundation soils, increased moisture content, reduced effective stress, and compromised pile stability. While not the primary confirmed trigger, personally I feel that this factor despite a good theory should be taken into account as a plausible contributing mechanism that exacerbated overall ground saturation and instability.

The following causes; however; are the commonly agreed, evidence-based causes cited by geotechnical studies and task-force reviews:

• Slope destabilisation from hilltop development and vegetation removal - Clearing and terracing reduced root strength, changed surface runoff and exposed slopes to erosion during heavy rain,

• Inadequate drainage and failed diversion pipe(s) - Diversion/pipe systems carrying the east creek and surface runoff either were under-designed, poorly installed or ruptured; water ingress and seepage into the slope greatly reduced soil shear strength and caused progressive erosion. Accounts point to burst diversion pipes and uncontrolled flow of silt, debris and water down the slope,

• Failure of retaining works / shallow support systems - Retaining walls and “raker/rail” piles used behind the car-park/retaining zones were unable to resist the lateral mass of saturated soil. Some authors point to inadequate design for lateral soil loads and progressive undermining of foundations,

• Inadequate site investigation and design assumptions - Subsequent case studies say geotechnical investigations, soil testing and slope stability analysis were insufficient or not conservative enough for the hillside conditions, thus, designs did not properly account for heavy rain pore pressure buildup and retrogressive failure mechanisms,

• Progressive (retrogressive) landslide mechanism - Once a lower portion failed (retaining wall/toe), the failure propagated upslope, moving very large volumes of saturated soil/mud that pushed on foundations (estimates in popular accounts describe huge volumes) and caused structural collapse. 

Put simply: water + unstable cut slope + insufficient drainage + inadequate retaining/foundation design = a retrogressive landslide that overloaded and undermined building foundations.

AI Generated Image - Simple Schematic - Not to Scale

3) Possible Institutional, Procedural failures 

During that time, the technical failures occurred in an environment of regulatory weakness, poor coordination and weak enforcement :

• Approvals without adequate hillside safeguards - Reviews after the event emphasised that state and local approvals allowed hillside development without consistent application of proper safeguards, guidelines or independent verification. The Malaysian Bar Task Force and subsequent studies list lack of compliance checks, inadequate planning procedures and approvals granted without sufficient technical oversight,

• Poor monitoring and maintenance - Drains, diversion pipes and retaining facilities require ongoing inspection and maintenance; the task force cites poor maintenance of drains/retaining walls and failure to act on residents’ complaints or visible signs,

• Fragmented responsibilities and weak verification of competence - The Task Force highlighted poor communication among developers, consultants, local authorities and state agencies and lack of independent verification of safety aspects for hillside works,

• Enforcement limits and legal immunity issues - In subsequent litigation the Ampang Jaya Municipal Council (MPAJ) was at first held to have some pre-collapse liability in lower courts, but the Federal Court later ruled (2006) that the local council was immune under provisions of the Street, Drainage and Building Act (SDBA) for “approval and inspection” functions, a significant legal outcome that limited civil claims against the local authority. That judgment shaped the legal aftermath and discussion about local authority duties. 

4) Authorities and Parties Involved

• Local authority (MPAJ at the time) : issues site approvals, inspects stormwater/drainage and enforces building codes. Investigations and the Task Force later criticised approval practice and monitoring but in litigation MPAJ successfully invoked limited immunity for its regulatory functions,

• Jabatan Kerja Raya (PWD) : involved in slope/road infrastructure and (later) commissioned government inquiries into Bukit Antarabangsa landslides. The Task Force referenced a federal JKR investigation whose full public release was an issue at the time,

• Landowners, developers, consulting engineers : the main parties responsible for safe design, correct earthworks, proper drainage and supervision. Civil suits were pursued against developers, engineers and other private parties. The technical reviews criticise competence and execution at the development level,

• Department of Environment (DOE) and Department of Occupational Safety & Health (DOSH)? : At the time, DOE is normally concerned with environmental impact, erosion control and consent conditions while DOSH at the time focuses on workplace safety (less central to a post-occupancy landslide, but relevant for construction phase safety). Public records and the Task Force emphasis focus mainly on planning, JKR and local council responsibilities (rather than DOSH actions in the disaster’s immediate technical causes, most published technical reviews do not place DOSH at the centre of the collapse causes as the original OSHA 93 was still at its' infancy stage (where the author was involved in the (unofficial) translation of the Parliament handsard in the consultancy capacity serving an Australia-Malaysia JV Safety Consultant)

5) Aftermath

Lawsuits followed - banks and some defendants settled with homeowners. The Federal Court ruling on MPAJ’s immunity (2006) was a landmark - it limited claims against local authorities for pre-collapse regulatory actions, which in turn shaped how liability is apportionable in Malaysia. 

The tragedy triggered repeated public and professional calls for better hillside development guidelines, stricter geotechnical standards, improved drainage and monitoring and clearer institutional responsibilities, many of which were reflected in later regulations, guidelines and the Task Force recommendations. 

6) Lessons Learned 

Practical recommendations that come from the literature and task-force reviews:

• Require competent, independent geotechnical investigation and slope stability analysis for all hillside works; design conservatively for worst-case rainfall/pore pressure,

• Do not allow unchecked top-cutting/overdevelopment without robust retaining systems, positive drainage and a mandatory maintenance plan,

• Insist on durable, inspected drainage/diversion works (pipes, gutters, culverts), surface runoff must not be allowed to concentrate onto or into slopes,

• Improve inter-agency coordination (local councils, JKR/DID, DOE - now known as OSC) and make roles/responsibilities and enforcement clear. 

• Implement slope monitoring, early-warning (movement, pore pressure) and community reporting channels so warning signs trigger action,

7) Short caveats about sources and remaining uncertainties

Multiple technical reviews and academic case studies (UM/UMP theses, research papers) analyze the geotechnical mechanisms; the Malaysian Bar Task Force collated legal and regulatory problems. Some government inquiry reports were not widely released at the time, and some fine technical details (exact pipe locations, as-built details of the retaining pile system) are reconstructed from expert testimony and post-event studies rather than a single public forensic report. 

8)  Other Tragedies

It's important to mention that there have been other incidents at the surroundings after the Highland Towers tragedy :

a) Taman Hillview landslide (20 Nov 2002) : A slope failure in Taman Hillview destroyed a bungalow and killed 8 people. Investigations indicated re-activation of an old landslide/filled zone.

Engineering summary: deep-seated re-activation of an earlier slide mass and unstable fills; local drains and slope materials were friable and became saturated after heavy rainfall/runoff concentration. The incident occurred only a few hundred metres from the Highland Towers site, showing persistent area vulnerability. 

b) Bukit Antarabangsa/Taman Bukit Mewah landslide (6 Dec 2008) : A large landslide destroyed multiple houses and killed several people (reports vary: 4–5 fatalities reported in multiple sources). The failure affected a wide swathe of slope (tens to a hundred metres scale).

Engineering summary: classified by investigators as a deep-seated landslide with a large crown width and significant depth; mechanisms included prolonged/intense rainfall, slope cutting/filling and poor retaining/foundation for slope toes. The failure measurements recorded (crest width, length, depth) are consistent with a deep, translational/rotational mass movement rather than a small local slip.

c) Numerous smaller but significant slides and reactivations (1993–2010s) : Multiple smaller incidents, slope reactivations and failures have been recorded across Ulu Klang/Bukit Antarabangsa (research reports and the Malaysian Bar Task Force catalogue dozens of events and many remediation works). Several caused property loss and some caused fatalities over the years. 

Engineering summary: many were rainfall-triggered, involved cut/fill zones or old landslide scars, and were aggravated by obstructed or misdirected drainage, poor retaining-wall construction (rubble or inadequately anchored walls), or the presence of loose fill materials. Research reviews count multiple major incidents in the area across two decades and emphasise recurring weaknesses in hillside approvals and maintenance. 

9) Recurring Technical Themes (why these keep happening)

• Rainfall + infiltration/pore pressure: Many failures were rainfall-triggered; prolonged or intense rain increases pore water pressure, reducing effective stress and shear strength of residual or fill soils. This is the proximate trigger in most cases,

• Human modification of slopes: Hill cutting, terracing, filling of gullies and vegetation removal changed the hills’ natural equilibrium and often created vulnerable geometry (steep free faces, overloaded benches),

• Inadequate or failed drainage/diversion works: Under-designed, clogged, ruptured or poorly maintained surface and subsurface drainage concentrated flow or allowed seepage into slopes, a common aggravating factor,

• Use of weak fills and poor retaining practice: Poorly compacted fill, rubble walls and non-engineered toe supports were repeatedly implicated. Deep seated failures often involve weak layers or interfaces beneath fills,

• Insufficient geotechnical investigation and oversight: Repeated studies call out limited site investigations, complacent assumptions about soil strength and lack of independent peer review for high-risk hillside works. 

9) Institutional/Regulatory Pattern

After each major failure there were reviews, task-forces and recommendations but published audits (and later events) suggest incomplete implementation, fragmented agency responsibilities and enforcement gaps (per Malaysian Bar Task Force and academic reviews).

10) Quick engineering implications/actions takes

• Treat the whole Bukit Antarabangsa/Taman Hillview area as high-risk: require full geotechnical reinvestigations and monitoring for any new works,

• Inspect and rehabilitate all drainage/diversion conduits: ensure positive discharge away from slopes,

• Replace or underpin weak retaining systems and replace loose fill with engineered solutions (anchors, deep piles, drained retaining systems),

• Enforce independent peer review, maintenance bonds and continuous monitoring (piezometers, inclinometers, rainfall thresholds & alarm/evacuation triggers). 

TUGU NEGARA AND GARDENIA BREAD

HARD TALK

First, it was the Tugu Negara being criticized for not looking 'Asian enough,' and now ‘Gardenia bread’ is supposedly being used to win over Sabahans (it's a mockery) based on rumours about East Malaysians buying it in bulk when they travel west, which frankly is nobody’s business as they are Malaysian Citizen, not some illegal immigrants.

Are these really critical issues that deserve discussion in Parliament or the State Assembly?

Seriously, this is nonsense. You can do better than embarrassing your own leader like this.